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ABSTRACT

Organizational Decision-Making in the Age of
Big Data and Artificial Intelligence
by
Anh Luong
Advisor: Karl R. Lang
This dissertation examines organizational decision-making in the context of big data and
artificial intelligence (machine learning) technologies. There are three studies. All three focus on
collaborative decision-making in organizations, with study 1 examining it in the context of big
data, while study 2 and 3 in the context of artificial intelligence.
Study 1: This study examines the impact of different manners of presenting information
on collaborative decision-making performance. Using controlled economic experiments, I assign
participants with a resource allocation decision-making task (adapted from the game theoretic
public goods provision problem) and examine the collaborative outcomes of groups when exposed
to different levels of information aggregation and visualization formats. Interestingly, the results
show that in certain cases, the more effective means of presenting information for individuals (i.e.,
graphs or tables compared to raw data) do not bode as well for groups. This study contributes to
the information visualization literature, which has mostly looked at individual decision-making,
by examining the collaborative task context and by combining perspectives from experimental
game theory, cognitive fit and information processing theories. Methodologically, this study also
contributes to the information visualization literature by accounting for the dynamics of
collaborative decision-making over time.
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Study 2: Organizations increasingly deploy artificial intelligence (AI) systems to automate
specific tasks and assist human experts in organizational decision-making. In this study, I focus on
complex task settings wherein human decision-makers work with AI systems. Using credit
authorization for consumer loans as our specific context, I conduct an economic experiment with
a repeated round design to investigate how organizations can create business value from the new
human–machine collaborative decision-making paradigm. This study contributes to extant
literatures on algorithmic decision-making and automation by moving beyond only examining
individual decision-makers’ attributes to examine the intertwined roles of organizational factors
and AI’s characteristics. The results show that when firms implement complementary
organizational practices in parallel with AI investments, they achieve higher levels of algorithm
appreciation, leading to better decisions, made with stronger confidence, in turn increasing
organizational profits. I also show that human decision-makers and machines develop increasingly
more effective work relationships over time and outperform AI machines in stand-alone settings.
Finally, I show evidence that keeping humans in the loop could enable AI-powered firms to
achieve the most productive outcomes.
Study 3: Extant research on algorithmic bias has mostly approached the subject from a
technical perspective, with few studies investigating the decision bias of human-machine
collaborative decision-making, wherein human experts have the final say after working with the
algorithms. In this study, I conduct a controlled economic experiment with a repeated-round
design. I assign participants with a task that models a complex organizational decision-making
process wherein human decision-makers (DMs) work with an AI repeatedly over 10 decision
periods to evaluate consumer loan applications. I use loan data from a large-scale, historic dataset
and manipulate the AI predictions to create two experimental conditions: (1) Prediction Bias,
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where DMs work with AI predictions that discriminate against one group of loan applicants and
favor another, and (2) No Bias, where DMs work with AI predictions that treat the two loan
applicant groups equally. This study contributes to current research on algorithmic bias mitigation
and bias in human-machine collaboration by showing that human DMs can over time learn to adapt
to a biased algorithm, implicitly detect the bias in the AI, adjust their behavior to significantly
improve their performance, and importantly, outperform the biased AI working alone, both in
terms of reducing decision bias and increasing organizational profit.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
While the explosive growth of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence (machine learning based)
technologies has led to automation replacing humans in many jobs, it has also created many
other roles wherein human experts actively work in groups, with each other and with the
intelligent machines, to make complex organizational decisions. Firms increasingly employ Big
Data and AI/ML to aid expert human decision-makers in their non-routine operations, however,
most are still struggling to reap substantial benefits from their investments. Extant research also
has not focused on the socio-technological factors when examining decision-making in the
context of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence. Motivated by this, I conduct three studies for my
dissertation to examine the organizational and technological factors that impact firm
performance when they employ Big Data and AI/ML in their non-trivial, complex decisionmaking operations with a focus on collaboration (human-human and human-machine).
The first study focuses collaborative decision-making in the context of Big Data. To make sound
decisions, firms need not only process the enormous amounts of potentially valuable data, but
also extract meaningful information and present it in such a way that can inform perceptions. In
this study, human DMs not only work with each other in groups (human-human collaboration),
but also with a computer that provides them with information presented in varying levels of
aggregation and visualization (human-machine collaboration). While there exists a rich body of
work that has looked at how individuals process information, current literature lacks a systematic
examination of how groups facing business problems perform when presented with information
provided under different schemes and formats. Thus, I conduct this study to examine how
different manners of providing information for group decision-making affect firm performance.
1

To examine the research question, I design an electronic platform in the laboratory to implement
a collaborative decision-making experiment using game theory.
The second and third study focus on human-machine collaboration in the context of AI/ML
technologies. Extant research on algorithmic decision-making has mostly focused on individuals’
characteristics while overlooking the important organizational and technological factors that
surround the use of AI in complex decision-making. Using an economic experiment with a
repeated round design, these two studies investigate how organizations can obtain the best results
from the human–machine collaborative decision-making paradigm. While both studies examine
measures of organizational performance (organizational profit, decision quality) and the humanmachine working relationship (algorithm appreciation, trust in AI), study 3 also focuses on
specifically the decision bias measures. Through a collaboration with DataRobot Inc., a leading
provider of automated machine learning services in the U.S, I design a decision-making platform
in the laboratory modeled after theirs and assign participants with a task in the consumer credit
authorization context.
Through these three studies, I wish to understand more the interaction between technology,
people, and organizational factors and how their interplay affects collaborative decision-making
and firm performance.
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CHAPTER 2
[STUDY 1]
IMPACTS OF INFORMATION PROVISION AND VISUALIZATION ON
COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING
1. Introduction
The present study examines the impacts of information provision and visualization schemes on
collaborative decision-making performance. Specifically, it examines such impacts in the case of
organizational decision-making on shared resource investments—investments made by multiple
units, which, if successful, can result in a resource to be shared among the units. In both the
general context of collaborative decision making and the specific context of organizational
decision-making aforementioned, various factors can be said to affect decision quality—the
decision makers’ competence, the dynamics among the deciding units, the nature of the decision
problem, among many others. Tightly integrated into these factors is the information
representing the decision problem provided to the decision makers. Only through information
can the decision problem be communicated to the decision makers and can the decision makers'
actions along with their wide ranging impacts be transmitted among themselves. It has been
established that information plays a crucial role in organizational decision-making and
information systems success (Delone & McLean 1992). Hence, it is important that information is
conveyed truthfully and effectively to decision makers (Zmud 1978; Ballow & Pazer 1985;
Wang & Strong 1996).
Not all information is accurate or useful; even when such quality information is obtained,
conveying it so as to minimize loss of meaning during the process is another challenge.
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Information Theory (Shannon 1948) states that the same information can be presented in
different ways and different formats and human decision makers may process information
differently depending how it is presented to them. Thus, individual and group decision quality
may be affected by not just what type of information that is available but also by the way it is
presented. In current times, with the explosion of big data and machine learning advances
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2017), organizations need to be able to leverage their data visualization
tools so that they can extract useful information from their data, and present it in a way that can
elicit insightful interpretations from key decision makers and leaders. Otherwise, their big data
resources will likely go to waste.
Motivated by this interesting challenge, the present study investigates the impacts of various
information visualization formats and provision schemes on collaborative decision-making
outcomes, with a focus on shared resource investment problems. This topic has been extensively
studied, however, with the focus mostly on individual decision-making performance (Todd &
Benbasat 1999; Speier, Vessey & Valacich 2003; Tam & Ho 2006; Park, Bellamy & Basole
2016; Keller & Staelin 1987; Malhotra 1982). Our study wishes to extend this literature by
examining the topic in the context of collaborative decision making, which is vastly different
from individual decision making, given that not only individuals’ capabilities, but also group
dynamics, exert considerable influence on the group decision outcomes.
2. Theoretical Foundation and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Information Processing Perspectives
We consider the perspectives of the Information Processing Theory (Miller 1956) and Cognitive
Fit Theory (Vessey 1991) to explain decision makers' behaviors in a collaborative setting. In the
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context of recurring decisions making on shared resource investments, decision makers typically
use the information that is available to them—e.g. what they, their group and each of the group
members invested and earned during the previous period—to compose a mental model in order
to discern patterns and trends to help them make (better) decisions for the next period. One
would expect that the more information that is available to the decision makers in such a case,
the easier it would be for them to analyze their partners’ behavior trends and strategize their
course of actions.
On the other hand, too much information might overload cognitive processing and hinder
decision making, as proposed by Information Processing Theory (Miller,1956). Additionally,
Miller (1956) also claims that, since we humans can typically only store approximately five to
nine units of information in their working memory at a time, we are inclined to process
information through the use of “chunking”—grouping large amounts of information into
chunks—each of which contains bits of information similar or related to each other. Thus,
recoding—aggregating information into fewer and larger chunks, is claimed to increase
information processing efficiency. Hence our first hypothesis:
H1: Providing decision makers with aggregated information will lead to better group
decision making performance, as compared to providing them with non-aggregated information.
Further, Cognitive Fit Theory (Vessey 1991) posits that users’ problem solving performance
improves when the physical presentation of a problem matches the nature of that problem and
the skills it requires. Applying the theory to comparing decision makers’ performance doing
spatial versus symbolic tasks, Vessey (1991) found that tables enabled decision makers to make
faster and more accurate decisions on symbolic tasks (which involve extracting discrete and
precise data values) than graphs, and while graphs allowed users to make faster decisions on
5

spatial tasks (which involve observing trends or relationships, and making associations) than
graphs, the decisions by these users were also less accurate. In the context of a multi-round
public goods game, the decisions made by decision makers regarding contributions in each round
resemble spatial tasks in a greater degree than symbolic tasks. We posit that while decision
makers would want to know exactly how much they and others have earned (symbolic), to a
greater extent, they would want to know and analyze the relationships among their own and the
group's contributions and earnings, as well as want to look at trends in the data across all rounds
(spatial). Hence our second hypothesis:
H2: Providing decision makers with information presented in graphs will lead to better
group decision making performance, compared to tables and raw texts.
2.2. Public Goods Provision
For the modeling of the collaborative decision making context that we are interested in—shared
resource investments—we borrow from a reference discipline, Experimental Economics, the
game theoretic insights of the public goods experiment. Public goods experiments have been
used extensively in various fields to study issues in collaborative resource contribution and
allocation. The term public good refers to any type of common resource (e.g. money, space,
benefits) that is both nontrival and nonexcludable—multiple people can consume the same unit
of a good simultaneously, and both those who do contribute to the good and those who do not are
equally able to consume it, respectively. Public goods experiments typically revolve around
decision makers that are assigned into groups, each decision maker being given some initial
amount of resources (expressed in tokens or points) and required to allocate such resources
between two accounts—their private and their group accounts. Each decision maker’s earnings
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are the sum of their private accounts and their portion of returns from the group account,
computed based on a predetermined rate.
Many variations of public goods experiments exist, each designed to study a specific context or a
class of context (see Davis & Holt 1993 for a comprehensive review). For our study, we use the
Provision Point Mechanism (PPM), as it matches our case of examination—shared, organizationwide funds that need a threshold (provision point) to be set up and distributed. Additionally,
since we wish to examine decision makers’ behaviors under a dynamic perspective, and given
that organizational decision-making typically occurs in a recurring manner, we implement and
analyze the multi-round version of the public goods provision experiment (as opposed to the oneshot version, where there is only one decision period).
3. Study Design
In order to examine our hypotheses, we design an electronic platform in the laboratory. We adopt
the methodology of experimental economics (e.g. Smith, 1976), which has increasingly been
used in the Information Systems field (Gupta et al. 2018, Adomavicius et al. 2013, Bapna et al.
2010, Cason et al. 2011, Hashim et al. 2016, Rice 2012). The methodology is rigorous for
examining humans’ decision making process when facing complex strategic tasks. We adapt the
parameters from a well-cited implementation by Bagnoli & McKee (1991). Our parameters are
detailed in Table 2.1.
The study has a factorial design with two factors: Provision Scheme (Full—providing all
participants’ data vs. Aggregate—only the average, minimum, and maximum values of the
group) and Visualization Scheme (Raw Data, Tabular, and Graphic Interactive).
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In each session, participants are randomly assigned to groups of 5 to engage in the decisionmaking experiment for 20 rounds (the number of rounds unknown to participants to avoid lastround irregular behaviors). Before they engage in the decision-making task, the instructions to
the task are explained to them. Then, they start making decisions and viewing the results (see
Figures 2.1a – 2.1f) after each round until all of the rounds have passed. The performance-based
earnings for participants range from approximately $5 - $15. The use of monetary incentive is
meant to induce rationally strategic behavior, following Induced Value Theory (Smith 1976).
Formally, the pay-off function for each of the 10 participants in our version of the game is the
following:
e -c,
𝑝! = $ " "
e" - c" + r,

g < 13
g ≥ 13

where p denotes each player’s pay-off value, e the initial endowment, c each player’s
contribution in tokens, r the reward, and g the amount of the group account in each period. The
experimental platform is implemented with the open source oTree software, which is developed
by Chen, Schonger, & Wickens (2016) and widely used for running controlled behavioral
experiments.
4. Measures
The study examines several facets of group decision-making outcomes: (1) groups’ ability to
(implicitly) coordinate around an equilibrium, (2) groups’ total contribution amount and (3)
earnings (individual and group). Table 2.2 summarizes these measures.
Groups’ ability to coordinate around an equilibrium is measured by the metric Distance to
Equilibrium (hereafter DTE) — computed as the absolute value of the difference between the
Total Group Contribution and the nearest equilibrium (there are two equilibrium values in this
8

public goods implementation: 0 and 13, where 13 is the Pareto-optimal equilibrium). Meaning, if
the group contribution is less than 6.5, the nearest equilibrium would be 0, and the DTE would
be the Group Contribution. If otherwise, the nearest equilibrium would be 13, and the DTE
would be | Group Contribution - 13 |.
Importantly, the study accounts for the round effects, separating and comparing the results of the
early rounds with that of the later rounds. The study is also aware of the inherent group’
dynamics and effects that might confound the experiment results, and thus, collects post-game
questionnaire responses regarding the group cohesion degree within each group in order to
potentially treat this as a control variable for the research model.
Further, the study accounts for other control variables, which include (1) pro-social trait, (2) risktaking trait (3) computer playfulness trait (4) cognitive styles (5) disposition to trust (6) group
cohesion; and for their demographic information (ethnicity/cultural, age, gender, education level,
academic concentration, work experience, English skill, quantitative skill). These are asked in
surveys given to participants prior- and post-experiment.
5. Results
5.1. Data Collection
Experiments were run using the subject pool of undergraduate Business major students at Baruch
College, during the month of November 2018. As many sessions as possible were conducted for
each treatment during this time period. Table 2.3 details how many groups (n = 5 each) each
treatment has. In total, there are 24 groups, with 5 subjects each group, totaling 120 subjects.
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5.2. Per-Round Trends
5.2.1. Group Contribution
Figure 2.2a. shows the line chart of the average group contribution of the full and aggregate
provision treatments across the 20 rounds. The chart shows that there are some slight differences
between the two provision schemes, however, they are not consistent throughout the entire
experiment. Groups with aggregate provision scheme, on average, contributed less than groups
with full provision scheme, in 12 rounds. The two lines keep alternating between rising above
and below each other throughout the rounds, only from round 15 to round 20, aggregate
provision scheme’s groups are shown to consistently contribute less than full provision scheme’s
groups.
Comparing among the 3 visualization schemes (figure 2.2b) shows clearer and more consistent
differences in average group contribution. Groups that were given information in graphs
contributed on average the least across all rounds, except the first round (slightly more than
table). Groups that were given information in raw data format contributed on average the most
across all rounds, except in rounds 7, 9, 15 (slightly less than table). Further, only groups
viewing information in graphs yielded average group contribution below the threshold (13
tokens) — starting from round 14 to round 20.
Figure 2.2c. shows the line graphs for the average group contribution of the groups given
aggregate information, comparing among the 3 visualization schemes. The differences in average
group contribution among the groups viewing three visualization schemes are considerably less
clear here. During the majority of the rounds, groups viewing graphs contributed on average the
least. In about half the rounds, groups viewing tables contributed on average the most.
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Figure 2.2d. shows the line graphs for the average group contribution of the groups given full
information, comparing among the 3 visualization schemes. The differences in average group
contribution among the groups viewing three visualization schemes are noticeably clearer here
(compared to figure 2.2c). In all of the rounds, groups viewing graphs contributed on average the
least (plummeting below the threshold in half the rounds). Also, in all of the rounds, groups
viewing raw data contributed on average the most.
5.2.2. Group Distance to Equilibrium (DTE)
Figures 2.3a - d show the trend lines comparing average DTE among the different visualization
schemes and between the two provision schemes. The differences are mostly similar to those
found when comparing average group contribution among the different visualization and
provision schemes.
Figures 2.4a – e show the trend lines comparing individual earnings among the
visualization and provision schemes. It appears that there are only marked differences between
the two provision schemes, and these differences are only mostly consistent starting from round
12.
5.3. ANOVA Tests
Two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the impacts of provision and visualization
schemes on group contribution, DTE, individual earnings & group earnings. Since the earnings
charts show that the differences are only mostly consistent starting from round 12, another
ANOVA test was run for individual and group earnings from round 12 to round 20.
The report for ANOVA tests that found some significant relationships is below.
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5.3.1. Group Contribution
The results for two-way ANOVA test, examining impacts of provision and visualization
schemes on group contribution (averaged across 20 rounds) are shown in table. Visualization is
found as a weakly significant factor, with p-value of 0.06. The impacts of provision schemes and
the interaction effects of provision and visualization were not found significant. Levene’s Test
was conducted to test for variance homogeneity, and with p-value of 0.4533. Thus, it is
concluded that the variances of the groups are found homogeneous.
Post-hoc Tukey test was run to test the significance of the impact of visualization. The
results show that only the difference in group contribution between raw data groups and graph
groups is weakly significant (p-value of 0.056), with a difference of 6.27.
5.3.2. DTE
ANOVA tests for impacts of provision and visualization on DTE averaged across 20
rounds and averaged across rounds 12-20 were run and no significant impact was found.
5.3.3. Individual Earnings
ANOVA test for impacts of provision and visualization on Individual Earnings averaged
across 20 rounds and no significant impact was found. Another ANOVA was run for Individual
Earnings averaged across rounds 12-20, and showed the impact of provision weakly significant
(p = 0.07). Levene’s Test was conducted to test for variance homogeneity, and with p-value of
0.4418, it is concluded that the variances of the groups are found homogeneous.
Tukey test results show that the impact of provision on average individual earnings is
weakly significant (p-value = 0.069), with - 0.89 as the value of difference in average individual
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earnings per round between full provision of information and aggregate provision of
information.
5.3.2. Group Earnings
Similar to individual earnings, ANOVA test for impacts of provision and visualization on
Group Earnings averaged across 20 rounds and no significant impact was found. Another
ANOVA was run for Group Earnings averaged across rounds 12-20, and showed the impact of
provision weakly significant (p = 0.07). Levene’s Test was conducted to test for variance
homogeneity, and with p-value of 0.4418, it is concluded that the variances of the groups are
found homogeneous.
Tukey test results show that the impact of provision on average individual earnings is
moderately significant (p-value = 0.069), with - 4.44 as the value of difference in average group
earnings per round between full provision of information and aggregate provision of
information.
5.4. Discussion
Considering the results presented above, it is concluded that our H1 is partially supported
and H2 is rejected. First, providing decision makers with aggregated information is shown to be
correlated with greater average group and individual earnings per round, compared to providing
decision makers with full information. However, there was no significance found for the impact
of aggregation on DTE or group contribution. Thus, H1 is partially supported. Second, since
there was significance found for the impact of visualization on group contribution but no
significance found for visualization’s impact on DTE or earnings (both group and individual),
H2 is rejected.
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This study builds on an established body of literature that has looked at how individual
decision makers use and process different information presentation formats to examine whether
the same effects at an individual level hold true for collaborative decision-making. While
information aggregation and graphical visualization have been shown to significantly improve
individual decision-making in previous studies, this study shows that these two factors do not
have the same positive effects in the group decision-making context of contribution for resource
allocation in orgazations. One possible reason for this is that there is an inherent mismatch
between the individual decision-makers’ incentives and the desired outcomes for their
organizations. Specifically, because the individual DMs’ pay-off matrix employed in this study is
adapted from public goods game theory, it would follow that free-riding (contributing nothing)
is, in many aspects, the easier route for DMs to earn the most for themselves, compared to trying
to estimate how much they should contribute that should be just enough for the common
resource to come to fruition but not too much that will end up negatively affecting their own
individual earnings.
In this study, this inherent incentive conflict is possibly made more apparent by the
presentation formats that povide information to DMs in a clearer manner (graphical and
aggregated information compared to tabular/raw data and full information), unlike in most
studies in the experimental public goods game literature which did not examine different
manners of presenting historic performance information to the DMs. Because of that, contrary to
what is found in most of the previous public goods game experiments (DMs make decisions that
over time reach the Pareto-optimal equilibrium), the DMs in this study when working with the
more advanced and clearer formats of information presentations, end up never reaching the
Pareto-optimal equilibrium, but seem to over time make increasingly more selfish decisions
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(approaching the other equilibrium that is not Pareto-optimal) that, although lead to increased
individual earnings, do not have as positive of an effect on their group/organizational
performance.
Thus, this study suggests that additional research is needed to further examine the role of
incentive structures that can align the individual DMs’ incentives with their organizational
strategic goals, in parallel with the investigation of different technological attributes (e.g.,
information presentation formats) that influence organizational decision-making performance.
Partially motivated by this, Study 2 which I present next in the following chapter examines and
highlights the dual importance of these two factors in decision-making in organizations, focused
on the collaboration between human DMs and the intelligent machines (computer system that
presents not only information but also recommendations in terms of predictions).
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CHAPTER 3
[STUDY 2]
HUMAN–MACHINE COLLABORATION AND ALGORITHMIC DECISION-MAKING IN
ORGANIZATIONS: EXAMINING THE ROLES OF INCENTIVE STRUCTURE AND AI
PREDICTIVE POWER
1. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI)1 and big data have radically transformed organizational decisionmaking across various fields (Figure 3.1). In the past, human experts used to and in many
contexts still serve as the principal decision-makers (i.e., expert-driven decision-making
(McAfee et al., 2012)). Today however, AI plays an increasing role in firms’ decision processes.
This occurs in two main ways. First, for simple and structured tasks, AI often serves as the sole
decision-maker in the process (i.e., automated decision-making). Second, for more complex and
less structured tasks, AI is often accompanied by human experts acting as the interlocutors of AI
predictions to co-create final decisions (Autor et al., 2019; Daugherty & Wilson, 2018; Malone,
2018) (i.e., human–machine collaborative decision-making). In our paper, we focus on the latter
type.
The importance of examining this organizational decision-making paradigm is threefold. First,
because in many complex task settings, the industry-standard AI power is not yet high enough to
warrant full automation, studying human-machine collaboration is crucial for organizational
success. More particularly, Brynjolfsson and Mitchel in 2017 (Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, 2017)
1

In this paper, we use the term AI to mean computing platforms that include predictive software systems based on statistical inference methods,
such as machine learning, neural networks, and classification methods, powered by massive, big-data management capabilities to solve complex
problems (James et al., 2013; Provost & Fawcett, 2013). Such computing technologies differ from classical AI based on symbolic reasoning
(Winston, 1977)
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report that most occupations (in the US) comprise of twenty to thirty specific tasks and that
professionals’ job is not simply to complete a task but to complete activities across tasks. They
argue that while AI is quite capable of automating specific tasks, it is not yet in a position (today
and in the foreseeable future) to fully replace occupational professionals and that firms’ focus
should be on how to redesign jobs where humans and AI can effectively work together rather
than automating them. Hence, human-machine collaborations will likely play an important part
in many professions.
Second, even in contexts with high AI power, a lot of times societal demands for ethical values,
fairness, and accountability require that human experts work alongside AI2. Third, extant
research is insufficient in examining the important socio-technical factors that determine humanmachine collaboration’s effectiveness, which, following the call for more research to address this
by Green and Chen (Green & Chen, 2019), we investigate in our paper.
In the newly emerging human–machine collaboration paradigm (also known as algorithmic
decision-making), AI technologies serve to augment humans’ knowledge and skills and, in turn,
improve decision outcomes (Autor et al., 2019). However, much of that depends on the extent to
which humans are able to effectively use its insights. While the extant literature on algorithmic
decision-making has recognized people’s ambivalent attitude to AI in terms of algorithm
aversion (reluctance to use algorithms, especially after witnessing their failures) (Dietvorst et al.,
2015) and algorithm appreciation (preference for using algorithms over human judgment) (Logg
et al., 2019), most of these studies have examined this matter solely from the individuals’
perspectives.

2

Lemonade insurance company faced intense backlash after claiming it used AI to review insurance claims for fraud; Amazon terminated its use
of AI in recruitment due to algorithmic biases against women
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In an organizational context, successful human–machine collaborative decision-making depends
on not only the human DMs’ traits or beliefs, but also the AI technological attributes and
critically, the organizational environment that directly governs the DMs and their usage of the
intelligent machine. In fact, despite many success stories of companies employing AI in specific
processes (e.g., to improve screening applications in hiring or to manage autonomous drilling in
mining (Daugherty & Wilson, 2018), etc.) most firms adopting AI technologies lack the
complementary foundational practices to effectively integrate the tools as well as to derive
business value from algorithmic decision-making (Chui & Malhotra, 2018). A recent industry
survey (Fountaine et al., 2019) found that only 8 out of the 1,000 organizations that have
invested in AI have developed practices that demonstrably support its firm-wide adoption. The
survey thus argued that appropriate transformation of organizational policies and processes is
crucial for successful AI implementation.
Similarly, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1996) found in 1996 that firms investing
in enterprise systems, a technology that had comparable high impact on organizational IT
infrastructures as AI systems today, struggled to create business value from the technology
unless they also redesigned business processes and organizational practices. Recently,
Brynjolfsson et al. in 2018 (Brynjolfsson et al., 2018) conjectured that implementation lags and
the need for complementary business innovations are the main reasons why most companies that
have substantially invested in AI technologies have been unable to generate measurable
productivity growth. They argued that it takes time before a new technology is fully diffused in
organizations and postulated that without necessary organizational changes, firms will find it
difficult to realize the full benefits from their investments.
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Motivated by this apparent need to examine both the technology and organizational factors and
also to consider learning effects over time when studying human-machine collaboration in
complex organizational decision-making, we pose the following research questions:
RQ1. What are the effects of AI performance characteristics (i.e., predictive accuracy) and
organizational incentive structure (i.e., strategic alignment) on firms’ outcomes (i.e.,
level of algorithm appreciation and firm performance) when they employ human-machine
collaboration for complex decision-making?
RQ2. What is the effect of time (i.e., number of decision-making periods) on organizational
outcomes (i.e., firm performance) when they employ human-machine collaboration for
complex decision-making?
To address these two questions, we conduct a controlled economic experiment with a repeatedround design and use absorptive capacity (ACAP) theory (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) as our
theoretical lens. We run our experiment in a simplified lab environment that models a complex
organizational decision-making process wherein human DMs work with AI capabilities
repeatedly over a number of decision periods to evaluate consumer loan applications. We use
loan data from a large-scale, historic dataset from Lending Club and actual algorithmic
predictions generated by DataRobot, a state-of-the-art enterprise automated AI platform3.
We find that, in our experimental setting, the firms that both invest in the new AI technology and
devise complementary organizational practices generated the best organizational outcomes,
achieved through productive human–machine teams that outperform high-power, autonomous AI
decision-making solutions. Not only that, the human-machine teams also become more effective

3

https://www.lendingclub.com, https://www.datarobot.com

19

over time. Moreover, we further show that in conditions of deteriorating algorithmic predictive
power, which may often occur in today’s dynamic business environments, having humans in the
loop safeguards firms against potential, significant losses. Our study therefore highlights the
continued essential roles of humans and organizational structure in the present age of rapid AI
diffusion in the workplace. While our experiment’s results may not fully transfer to real-world
settings, as we conducted controlled lab experiments using one specific task context and student
subjects, our findings do at least highlight the potential benefits of human-machine collaboration
across different work configurations that future research can further validate using other
methodologies, task contexts, and subject pools.
We contribute to the emerging algorithmic decision-making literature by providing experimental
evidence that organizational decision-makers, when given enough exposure to a high-power AI,
complemented by a proper incentive structure, along with continual feedback, do build
productive collaborations with the machine that strengthen over time. This leads to better quality
decisions, made with stronger confidence, and higher profits for the organization. In such cases,
the human–machine teams perform better than the machines alone and the humans alone.
Importantly, as the AI predictive power in many industries today can and does degrade over
time, often unexpectedly, our findings suggest that humans are needed to stay in the loop not
only to work with the machines to improve outcomes for the organization, but also to oversee the
process, intervene when needed, and perform necessary remedial actions.
2. Related Literature
Two traditional literature streams in IS relate to our study. First, the adaptive system usage
(ASU) literature (Elie-Dit-Cosaque & Straub, 2011; Sun, 2012) focuses on examining the factors
that lead to different adaptation behaviors when using IT in organizations (e.g., trying,
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substituting, combining, repurposing features) and different strategies of adapting to disruptive
IT (benefits maximizing/satisficing, disturbance handling, and self-preservation). Similarly, the
theory of Adaptive Structuration (AST), on which many of the studies in this literature are
grounded, studies the various appropriation behaviors of the structures that IT bring about, and
posits that faithful appropriation combined with decision processes that fit the corresponding
tasks will lead to desired IT use outcomes (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994). Second, the tasktechnology fit literature (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995) looks at the users’ perceptions of the
“fit” between a specific technology’s and a task’s characteristics. One of its main implications is
that either the technology or the task must be modified to fit with the other.
However, algorithmic decision-making presents a new organizational phenomenon that goes
beyond IT adaptation: it is inter-disciplinary in nature and has been examined from various
perspectives including information systems, but also economics, computer science, law,
management science, marketing, organizational behavior, and psychology. The paradigmshifting nature of the current AI technologies has changed how today’s decision support systems
are designed and used in organizational decision-making. To that end, AI systems, including
machine learning applications, may be viewed as a new generation of AI-powered, intelligent
DSS systems (IDSS) that raise new questions on how decision-makers respond to and utilize
them (Perraju, 2013). Next, we review two recent research streams that are most directly related
to our study: algorithm aversion/appreciation and automation.
2.1. Algorithm Aversion and Appreciation
The growing literature on algorithm aversion and appreciation has primarily examined the
utilization of algorithms in decision-making from the individual DMs’ perspectives. Aversion
and appreciation are opposite behaviors along the same theoretical dimension representing
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people's attitudes towards using algorithms for decision making. The main premise of the studies
in this area is that algorithmic predictions are often more accurate than humans’, hence, the more
closely the decision-makers listen to the algorithms, the better (Dietvorst et al., 2015). The
studies typically employed experiments to examine whether people prefer to use algorithmic
predictions or human predictions (their own or others') when completing tasks such as making
forecasts, estimates, and recommendations; along with their corresponding performances.
A few of these studies highlighted the algorithm aversion phenomenon, wherein decision-makers
(DMs) showed significant reluctance to use machine-learning-based AI, especially after they see
the AI err (Dietvorst et al., 2015; Dzindolet et al., 2002; Yeomans et al., 2019). However, other
studies have also described the opposite phenomenon, algorithm appreciation (Logg et al., 2019),
wherein DMs actively used and often preferred AI predictions over human predictions (Dijkstra,
1999; Goodyear et al., 2016). Among these studies, several explicitly presented the conditions
under which people were more likely to use AI: when the system was explained and made more
understandable (Yeomans et al., 2019); when people had control over the extent to which they
could use the system rather than allowing the system to completely take over (Dietvorst et al.,
2015, 2016; Logg et al., 2019); when they tackled tasks for which they lacked expertise or prior
experience (Logg et al., 2019); and when the tasks were objective rather than subjective
(Yeomans et al., 2019).
Relatedly, a stream of studies in the human–computer interaction discipline have investigated
algorithmic decision-making by examining the human–computer interface and by designing AI
systems with the goal of improving the user experience when utilizing the features and functions
embedded in such systems (Alexander et al., 2018).
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2.2. Automation
The automation literature mostly focuses on evaluating tasks to find out whether or not they are
suitable for automation. The results have been mixed. Agrawal et al. (Agrawal et al., 2018)
argued that humans will still hold an edge over AI in tasks that have complex, multidimensional
objectives not yet codifiable by algorithms, and especially in rare and unusual decision-making
cases that require tacit knowledge and subjective judgment. Conversely, Cowgill (Cowgill, 2018)
showed that machines picked better candidates than humans when screening resumes for labormarket hires, a task that actually involved a considerable amount of subjective judgement—
evaluating the candidates’ soft skills. Claussen et al. (Claussen et al., 2019) showed that people
outperformed AI in curating news items when there were limited data available. However, they
lost to the machine when the amount of relevant data increased. Brynjolfsson and Mitchell
(Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, 2017) argued that the effects of AI on jobs and labor demand were
more complex than mere labor substitution: since industries are still very far away from the type
of general-purpose AI that can complete the full range of human activities, jobs comprising
repetitive, mundane, and structured tasks are currently the ones mostly used for AI substitution.
They thus predicted that the demand for these kinds of jobs will continue to fall, whereas the
opposite will happen with jobs involving tasks that complement these systems.
There are three important aspects that the extant literature has not fully examined, which we
investigate in our experiment. First, most current experimental studies on algorithm
aversion/appreciation did not examine organizational factors that could either impede or promote
the effective utilization of AI. It has been established that users, both individuals and
organizations, can benefit by employing AI to some degree in their daily activities and
operations. What is not clearly understood is whether and how other factors that are external to
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the users and external to the AI can influence the algorithmic decision-making processes and
outcomes. This is an important issue to examine, because, as with other technologies, AI is not
independent of the organizational environment surrounding its use. Furthermore, most of these
studies primarily focused on human users’ traits and attitudes (e.g., overconfidence, sense of
control or ego (Dietvorst et al., 2015, 2016), expertise (Logg et al., 2019), perception of AI
popularity (Alexander et al., 2018) while largely overlooking AI’s varying technological and
performance characteristics that could potentially engender or hinder DM trust4.
Second, most of the algorithm aversion/appreciation experimental studies, in their examinations
of DMs’ reactions to AI (either before or after seeing it perform), have only employed a one-shot
or two-stage design, without considering the possible effects of the DMs’ repeated interaction
with the AI. The few that did rarely provided the DMs with continuous feedback on the
performance of the AI system and themselves over time5. Third, most studies in the automation
literature, to explore the types of tasks appropriate for automation, have only compared
performance between humans and machines, and not yet demonstrated whether and in which
conditions human and AI partnership could surpass the automated machine.
2.4 Organizational Adoption of AI
No causal evidence, only surveys. While surveys tend to allow for greater sample size and higher
generalizability, our research approach of using controlled economic experiment provides us
with stronger causal evidence and a higher degree of internal validity.

4

Except for Dzindolet et al. (Dzindolet et al., 2002). Although Yeomans et al. (Yeomans et al., 2019) considered algorithm understandability, this
is not an inherent attribute of AI, but rather an additional descriptive feature. Although Alexander et al. (Alexander et al., 2018) examined the
impact of users’ knowledge of an AI’s prediction accuracy, they did not causally examine how DMs reacted to AI systems of varied predictive
accuracy levels (i.e., the AI’s actual attribute).
5
Except for Alexander et al. 2018 (Alexander et al., 2018) and Goodyear et al. 2016 (Goodyear et al., 2016). However, neither provided explicit
feedback on the AI’s performance (in each round or cumulatively) throughout the repeated rounds/trials.
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3. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development
While IT adaptation is an important element in our work, we are grounding our research model
more specifically in absorptive capacity (ACAP) theory, originally developed by Cohen and
Levinthal (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990), to emphasize that it is the redesign and
reorganization of work processes, enabled through IT adaptation but coupled with organizational
process changes, that drive firm performance. Cohen and Levinthal proposed that organizations
more capable of recognizing new valuable external knowledge, attaining it, integrating it into
their operations, and in turn improving their outcomes, are more likely to develop and sustain
competitive advantage. Such capability describes a firm’s ACAP. Cohen and Levinthal (Cohen
& Levinthal, 1990) further posited that, to develop ACAP, two principal factors are key: (1)
cognitive structures, which refer to organizational knowledge resources that can increase
employees’ and their organization’s readiness to recognize and absorb new valuable knowledge;
and (2) knowledge transfer processes, which refer to organizational practices that can effectively
turn employees’ individual-level ACAP’s into organizational-level ACAP (Roberts et al., 2012).
We conceptualize these two factors respectively as the AI system and incentive structures that
are adopted by a firm and examine their impacts on organizational ACAP (Figure 3.2).
Conceptually, the AI represents an organizational cognitive structure that encodes a firm’s
existing knowledge and combines it with external knowledge from various sources by employing
sophisticated big-data management capabilities and advanced machine-learning inference
methods. It thus provides valuable external knowledge in the form of algorithmic predictions that
assist firms’ DMs in achieving organizational goals. The firm’s individual DMs can access this
valuable knowledge and apply it to various degrees in their work. However, there is a multitude
of ways that such knowledge can be absorbed and integrated in the actual decision-making
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process, leading to different final decisions that yield various outcomes. Not all applications will
benefit the organization. In fact, some could cause serious harm. As such, firms should develop
organizational processes to design and implement appropriate mechanisms, such as incentive
structures, that can entice the DMs to exploit effectively the knowledge resource, in turn
achieving the firm’s objectives. Thus, incentive structure represents a key knowledge transfer
process within organizations.
The original ACAP framework by Cohen and Levinthal conceptualizes ACAP as a construct that
exists at both individual and organizational levels. In fact, one of its main propositions describes
what firms should do to effectively translate individual ACAPs into organizational ACAP. More
specifically, ACAP theory posits that a firm’s rich cognitive structure drives the ACAP of both
its individual members and the whole organization (examined in our H1, H2), while the impact
of a firm’s knowledge transfer process on the firm’s ACAP (examined in our H3, H4) focuses on
organizational-level ACAP as the outcome (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) (p. 131-132).
Empirical researchers who have examined ACAP theory, including information system (IS)
researchers, have employed a variety of designs that conceptualize and measure this construct at
various levels of analysis, including individual, team, organizational, inter-organizational, and
mixed levels (Roberts et al., 2012). Roberts et al. 2012 (Roberts et al., 2012) comprehensively
reviewed the use of ACAP in IS research and reported that, of the 98 IS studies that used ACAP
as their theoretical lens, 64 used the organizational level of analysis, 25 used individual level, 7
used inter-organizational level, and 2 used team/group level. It is also quite common for
researchers to use individual organizational actors and DMs as organizational proxies that
collectively represent organizational-level actions and decisions (e.g. individual agents acting as
firms participating in auctions, bargaining, negotiations, and labor markets, etc. (Fréchette &
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Schotter, 2015; Gupta et al., 2018)). In this study, we measure the construct ACAP at both
individual and organizational levels.
3.1. Impact of AI Technology Performance Level (Predictive Accuracy)
A firm’s ACAP depends on the richness and accessibility of its cognitive structures, which firms
may design as shared organizational knowledge resources (Attewell, 1992). IS researchers using
ACAP theory have conceptualized firms’ cognitive structures specifically in the form of their
information technology (IT)-based knowledge resources (e.g. IT infrastructures, IT capabilities)
(Chatterjee et al., 2002; Chircu & Kauffman, 2000; Roberts et al., 2012). Similarly, we view a
firm’s implemented AI system, in essence a knowledge resource that combines data management
and inference capabilities, an instantiation of its cognitive structures. According to Cohen and
Levinthal (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), the better the cognitive structure (the AI system), the
higher the firm’s ACAP. Predictive power is considered a key AI technology performance
characteristic. Thus, we operationalize AI technology characteristics in terms of predictive
accuracy and hypothesize its positive impact on a firm’s ACAP.
Such potentially positive impact, however, largely depends on if and how the organizational
DMs actually use the system’s algorithmic predictions. The algorithmic decision-making
literature has found conflicting evidence of both algorithm aversion and appreciation by people.
(see Section 2). Further, few studies have examined the impacts of AI systems’ varying
characteristics on DMs’ algorithm usage, which we do in our study.
A high predictive accuracy AI system makes better predictions through encoding more
knowledge via larger training datasets which incorporate a larger number of observations (rows)
and variables (columns) and by using smarter algorithms. The AI system thus represents a
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critical knowledge resource, or in other words a rich organizational cognitive structure, whose
quality (i.e., performance level6), as posited by ACAP theory (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), should
drive the access and usage of its algorithmic predictions by organizational agents. Specifically,
organizational DMs should recognize the valuable knowledge in the form of high accuracy AI
predictions more than that of low-accuracy predictions, in turn accessing and using them to a
greater degree.
Furthermore, in ACAP theory, the levels of access (passive) and usage (active) of the external
knowledge by organizational agents, wherein usage is predicated on access, are critical
components of a firm’s ACAP. In the context of our study, we view such access and usage as an
indicator of algorithm appreciation, a critical factor for designing effective forms of human–
machine collaboration. When human DMs learn to effectively collaborate with machines and
their predictions, the firm by extension can better apply the valuable external knowledge encoded
within the AI system in their organizational processes. For our experiment, we manipulate
predictive accuracy at the organizational level and measure algorithm appreciation at the
individual level using decision revision rate: the frequency with which the DMs revert their own
initial decisions to follow AI predictions. Thus, within our study’s given decision context of
reviewing consumer loan applications (see Section 1), we hypothesize the following:
H1: AI predictive accuracy is positively associated with algorithm appreciation (i.e., decision
revision rate), in human-machine collaboration.
In addition to how much a firm’s individual DMs access and use valuable knowledge
(predictions) provided by the AI resource (i.e. algorithm appreciation), the extent to which the

6

In this paper, when describing the AI system, we use quality, performance level, predictive power, predictive performance interchangeably to
mean predictive accuracy.
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firm’s outcomes are improved as a result of such knowledge internalization is another critical
component of the firm’s ACAP. As such, ACAP theory (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) predicts that
the quality of the implemented AI resource (performance level in terms of predictive accuracy)
also drives organizational outcomes, specifically, in Cohen and Levinthal’s terms, the firm’s
“commercial ends”. In our study, we use organizational profit as the ultimate, organizationallevel measure of such commercial outcomes. Hence, we propose our second hypothesis:
H2: AI predictive accuracy is positively associated with organizational outcomes (i.e.,
organizational profit), in human-machine collaboration.
3.2. Impact of Incentive Structure Alignment
ACAP theory proposes that although a firm’s ACAP is a function of its individual members’
ACAPs, it is more than merely their sum: it especially depends on the knowledge transfer
processes that can effectively blend and transform the various members’ individual-level ACAPs
into a unified organizational-level ACAP (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) (p. 131-132). The ACAP
literature has conceptualized knowledge transfer processes in the form of organizational
practices, such as firm policies, routines, dominant logics, and competencies. Particularly,
studies in the incentive alignment literature (Carpenter & Sanders, 2002; Fama, 1980; Jensen &
Murphy, 1990; Nyberg et al., 2010) show that when a firm implements a risk–reward incentive
structure (e.g., compensation policy) that aligns the employees’ incentives with the firm’s
strategies, it achieves better outcomes. Conversely, when these two factors misalign, the firm’s
outcomes suffer.
These studies largely ground their theoretical arguments in agency theory, which focuses on the
problems of interest conflicts and separation of ownership between the owners of a business (the
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principals) and the managers or employees (the agents) who are hired to manage the business on
behalf of the principals. The principals have a stake in whether or not the firm succeeds but need
to rely on the agents to conduct and control many of the company’s operations. The agents on the
other hand make many decisions that directly affect firm performance but often do not share the
same goals with the principals—they may be more motivated by their personal interests.
Additionally, agents may make decisions that do not benefit the firm and the owners due to
differing values (ethics, morality, etc.) and levels of risk tolerance.
The agency problem can be controlled by aligning incentives between the agents and the
principals, among other approaches. One common route for achieving such incentive alignment
is through compensation policy. That is, compensating the agents positively (rewarding) for
decisions that help achieve the owners’ goals and negatively (penalizing) for decisions that deter
them. This way, a major part of the agents’ personal interests (how much they earn) are directly
tied to the company’s and the principals’ own benefits, thus motivating them to act in the
company’s best interests.
Drawing on ACAP and incentive alignment research, we theorize that the alignment of a firm’s
incentive structure with its strategy positively influences its ACAP. Particularly, such welldesigned organizational practice will act as an effective knowledge transfer process through
clearly communicating its strategy to the employees and thus guiding their decision-making in a
way that adheres to and achieves the organizational strategic goals. Thus, the employees’
individual absorptive capacities are translated effectively into the firm’s overall absorptive
capacity: its organizational-level outcomes are improved.
Regarding firm strategies, in the decision-making context of our experiment set-up (loan
applications review), some lenders may tolerate higher levels of risks than others. Risk-averse
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lenders (e.g., traditional retail banks) may then prefer funding relatively safe loans while
avoiding riskier ones, thereby trading off some business opportunities to guard against possible
losses. In this study, we assume a specific organizational strategy that is risk-averse7. Following
the logic above, we posit that when a conservative, risk-averse lending firm implements an
incentive structure at the organizational level that aligns its employees’ incentives with its given
strategy, its organizational-level commercial outcomes will benefit accordingly (i.e., the lender
will reap higher organizational profit). Hence, we propose:
H3. Strategic alignment (misalignment) of incentive structure is positively (negatively)
associated with organizational outcomes (i.e., organizational profit), in human-machine
collaboration.
3.3. Interaction Effect
ACAP theory suggests that a firm’s knowledge resources and its organizational practices are, to
some extent, interdependent and should be designed concurrently. Similarly, Brynjolfsson and
Hitt in 1996 (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1996) show that IT enterprise systems and organizational
practices are interdependent and impact firm outcomes. Brynjolfsson et al. in 2018 (Brynjolfsson
et al., 2018) predicted specifically that AI systems and organizational practices are likewise
intertwined in terms of impacting organizational outcomes. Only adopting an AI system may not
generate much organizational benefit if it is not also complemented with an incentive structure
that connects decision logic with firm strategy. This is because human DMs may not be properly
incentivized and rewarded (penalized) for their successes (failures) in using AI in terms of

In the present study, we do not consider other, more risk-tolerant strategies that could be espoused by more aggressive lenders. In ongoing
research, we are modeling lending strategy as a third treatment with two conditions: risk-averse and risk-tolerant.
7
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improving (hurting) organizational outcomes. On the other hand, strategically aligned incentive
structures could more effectively protect DMs from making poor decisions when working with
low-performance AI predictions. However, at higher levels of performance, the powerful AI
resource can offset poorly aligned incentive structures. Likewise, deploying a suitable incentive
structure is insufficient if the technology assisting the decision-making process is sub-par,
because a low-performing AI produces predictions that might provide confusing signals to the
human DM who follows the incentive logic. Hence, in accordance with Cohen and Levinthal
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) and Brynjolfsson et al. (Brynjolfsson et al., 2018; Brynjolfsson &
Hitt, 1996), we hypothesize the presence of an interaction effect between AI predictive power
and strategic alignment on organizational outcomes. Specifically:
H4. The effect of incentive structure alignment on organizational outcomes (i.e., organizational
profit) is stronger (weaker) in the presence of low (high) AI predictive accuracy, in humanmachine collaboration.
3.4. Learning Effect
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) further posit that an organization’s absorptive capacity is path
dependent — a firm’s prior knowledge absorption will allow for further knowledge absorption
and increased firm performance in the future. Thus, ACAP is a dynamic construct, which
develops and evolves over time (Todorova & Durisin, 2007). However, most of the IS studies
that used ACAP have operationalized the construct as either an asset or a static capability
(Roberts et al., 2012). Similarly, much of the wider ACAP literature has looked at the construct
in a fixed manner, not examining its dynamics over time (Omidvar et al., 2017). The few that
treated ACAP as a dynamic capability (Malhotra et al., 2005; Omidvar et al., 2017; Pavlou & El
Sawy, 2006) have not measured or demonstrated the changes of ACAP over time in a
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longitudinal manner. Rather, they used case studies or built theoretical frameworks to focus on
the factors and the processes that are perceived to drive one stage of firm performance to the next
(e.g., from potential ACAP to realized ACAP). A similar focus predominates the organizational
learning literature in the management discipline (Dutton & Thomas, 1984; Huber, 1991;
Tomblin, 2008).
The firm progress literature (Dutton & Thomas, 1984) has specifically modeled firm
performance increase rate over time and also examined the various factors (e.g., organizational
structure, policies, technology investments, etc.) that influence it. Particularly, one of the major
causal factors for firm progress in this literature is referred to as the Horndal-plant labor effect
(Lundberg, 1961). In the Horndal iron works in Sweden over 15 years productivity increased 2%
each year without any new investment. This observed improvement in performance is attributed
to employees’ increased familiarity with the task and the technological tool over time (Dutton &
Thomas, 1984). Relatedly, Brynjolfsson and Hitt in 1996 (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1996) found
empirically that it took several years before firms’ investments in new enterprise systems showed
bottom line effects on firm earnings, because it required not just IT adoption and adaptation but
also additional, complementary business process redesigns before the firms were able to leverage
the new technological capabilities for measurable firm performance enhancements. They
concluded by proposing theoretically that it takes time for organizations to learn how to best
integrate new technology in their organizational work processes before they can reap tangible
benefits from their technology investments. In a recent follow up paper, Brynjolfsson et al in
2018 (Brynjolfsson et al., 2018) extend their theoretical and empirical analysis to specifically
include the impact of AI technology investments on firm performance.
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In our study, we have the decision-makers review 100 loan applications over the course of 10
decision periods. After each period, they are shown a results page providing immediate, clear,
continual feedback on how they and the algorithm performed, on each specific loan, overall, in
each round, and cumulatively over all previous rounds. Thus, we operationalize time through
each decision period. Following the logics aforementioned from the ACAP and the firm progress
literatures, we posit the general learning effect of the organizational ACAP construct in our
study:
H5. There are positive organizational learning effects in human-machine collaboration—over
time, organizational outcomes (i.e., organizational profits) increase.
4. Methodology
As aforementioned, most current studies examining factors influencing human-machine
collaboration have not considered organizational factors. The few studies that did, have only
done so using surveys. In other words, there is a lack of causal examination in the literature
regarding organizational factors’ impacts on firms’ performance when they employ AI for
human-machine collaborative decision-making. Thus, we adopted experimental economics
(Friedman et al., 1994) because the method has proved valuable for establishing strong causal
relationships with high internal validity when researchers study individual strategic actions in an
economic, organizational setting and their resulting organizational outcomes (Fréchette &
Schotter, 2015; Gupta et al., 2018).
We designed a controlled lab experiment and ran experimental sessions with a total of 152
subjects. Table 3.1 summarizes our study design. The participants were undergraduate students
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majoring in Business8 at a large university in the U.S.9 Subjects earned a flat reward ($5) for
completing the entire session and a bonus reward determined by their decision-making
performance in the experiment (total ranging $5–$20, averaging about $10). In the experiment,
participants worked with an AI tool to evaluate consumer loan applications and made the final
decisions (approve/reject). We employed the AI platform DataRobot™ to generate and select the
algorithmic predictions shown to the participants. We used a historic dataset from Lending Club
that comprises real consumer-loan applications and real loan performance data for the loans that
were funded, including interest rates, monthly payments, late payments, and defaults. Because of
that, we knew which loans performed well and which did not. The participants in the experiment
saw the simplified consumer loan application data but not the loan performance data when they
made their decisions. The participants’ decision-making performance, however, was determined
based on the real loan performance data.
4.1. Experimental Task
The participants were required to review a set of 100 consumer loan applications10, split over 10
repeated decision rounds, with 10 applications per round. Participants received immediate
feedback after each round. They were asked to make loan approve/reject decisions with the aid
of an AI tool, whose predictive model11 had been trained on a real world, large scale, historic
dataset. The loan applications that the participants reviewed in the experiment are different from
the loan dataset used for training the algorithmic model. In every round, the loan review task

8

Using undergraduate students as subjects in economic experiments to test organizational strategic actions is a commonly adopted and valid
practice ((Frechette, 2015; Gupta et al., 2018)). Further, we controlled for our subjects’ quantitative competencies, work experience, and
familiarity with the given task context.
9
Gender: 43.42% Female, 49.34% Male. College level: 58.55% lower (Freshman, Sophomore), 34.21% upper (Junior, Senior). Ethnicity:
46.05% Asian/Pacific Islander, 23.03% White, 13.82% Hispanic/Latino, 5.92% Black, 3.95% N/A.
10
In our experiment we used only the loans with comparable requested amounts, ranging from $20,000—$35,000. We also informed the
experiment participants of this fact in the data glossary that we handed out to the participants and that we instructed them to read carefully before
participating in the loan review task. Further, we randomized the order of the loans across the 10 rounds and within each round.
11
The particular algorithm was based on ensemble modeling, which combines several classification models to optimize performance.
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occurred in three stages (see Figure 3.3). Stage 1 included the initial decisions. The subjects
received a table containing information about 10 different loan applications. They reviewed the
applications, made initial decisions (approve or reject), and rated their level of confidence (0–
100) in their decisions. Stage 2 included the AI predictions and final decisions. The subjects
were shown the AI predictions for the loan applications that they had just reviewed. Based on the
new information, they had an opportunity to revise their decisions and confidence levels before
submitting their final decisions. Stage 3 included the results. The system presented how the loans
actually performed, the subjects’ and the AI’s performance statistics (i.e., rate of correct
decisions), and their cash earnings from each decision, the round total, as well as the cumulative
total.
4.2. Experimental Procedures
Each experimental session took place in a computer lab and lasted between 60–75 minutes from
check-in to check-out. Sessions were scheduled according to a pre-determined plan with several
sessions for each experimental treatment. The number of participants varied (ranging 2–17) for
each session. After participants checked in, they were randomly seated at a workstation. First,
they completed a pre-experiment survey of demographic questions and about their personal
traits. Next, the subjects viewed instructions in the form of a pre-recorded video that explained in
detail the loan review task and the financial reward structure, i.e., the pay-off matrix that showed
how much they will earn or lose for each correct (incorrect) loan decision. The subjects did not
know that there were multiple treatments, nor did they know which particular treatment they
were participating in. Finally, the subjects were paid in cash, according to how much they earned
in the task, and dismissed.
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4.3. Experimental Treatments
Our experiment followed a 2×2 factorial between-subject design (see Table 3.2). The two factors
were AI predictive accuracy and incentive structure alignment. In addition to the treatment
conditions, we also designed a baseline (human-only) condition that did not involve any AI
predictions in the loan review process. Everything else in our experimental design remained the
same in the baseline condition, except that because there were no algorithmic predictions, the
subjects only submitted their decisions for the loan applications once in each round.
Place Table 2 About Here
We manipulated AI predictive accuracy at two levels: low (60%) and high (80%). In the low
treatment, 6 of 10 (on average, per round) algorithmic predictions shown to the subjects were
correct. In the high treatment, 8 of 10 (on average, per round) were correct. Subjects were
exposed to the same treatment in all 10 rounds. They were told about the AI’s predictive
accuracy rate, but they did not know that there were two levels used in the experiment, or that the
AI with which they interacted was considered to have “high” or “low” accuracy level.
We manipulated incentive structure alignment at two levels, aligned and misaligned, through two
pay-off matrices (see Table 3.3) that modeled incentive mechanisms consistent (discordant) with
our assumed conservative lending strategy. We induced the assumed, fixed conservative, riskaverse organizational lending strategy in our experiment, by telling the subjects to “imagine that
you are a loan officer for a traditional retail bank” and “your task is to identify and eliminate
risky loan applications”. Subjects did not know there were two different incentive structures that
were intended to “align” or “misalign” their incentives with the organizational lending strategy,
nor were they told the label of the particular incentive structure they were assigned to.
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All DMs in both aligned and misaligned conditions earned $0.2 for each correct decision (i.e.,
approve or reject), and nothing for each false reject (type-I error). They lost $1 for each false
approve decision (type-II error) in the aligned condition and nothing in the misaligned condition.
The aligned condition’s incentive mechanism was designed to connect the DMs’ rewards to the
risk-averse, conservative lending strategy that we stipulated for the study, i.e., it discouraged
subjects from making risky bets via high penalties for the wrong approve decisions (type-II
errors). Conversely, in the misaligned condition, type-I and type-II errors were both penalty-free
and treated the same, which was designed to induce more risk-seeking loan review decisions,
i.e., the DMs’ reward structure discorded with the assumed conservative strategy of the firm.
Manipulation checks results showed that our manipulation worked as intended. Subjects in the
aligned condition rejected significantly more loans (p < 0.001) and approved significantly fewer
loans (p < 0.001) than did those in the misaligned condition.
5. Measurements
We measured algorithm appreciation with revision rate (𝑅𝐸𝑉) at the individual level, and
organizational outcomes with organizational profit (𝑂𝑃) at the organizational level, per round
and DM.
Revision rate (𝑹𝑬𝑽) is the percentage of initial loan decisions contradicting the AI’s predictions
that the DMs revised in the final decisions stage to follow the AI. A higher rate shows a greater
degree of algorithm appreciation and willingness to collaborate with the AI.

REV!" =

∑$#%& R !"#
∑$#%& C!"#

(Revision rate of each DM in each round)
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1,
R !"# = '
0,
C!"# = '

1,
0,

if D'!"# ≠ D(!"# and D(!"# = D)'
"#
if otherwise

(A loan decision revised by a DM per the AI in a
round)

if D'!"# ≠ D)'
"#
if otherwise

(A DM’s initial decision that contradicted
the AI on a loan application in a round)

i = DM 1, 2, 3, …, I; I = 152
r = round 1, 2, 3, …R; R = 10
j = loan application number 1, 2, 3, … J; J = 10 (in each round)
D$!"# = DM i’s non-blank initial decision on loan application j in round r
D%!"# = DM i’s non-blank final decision on loan application j in round r
D&$
"# = the AI’s decision on loan application j in round r

Organizational profit (𝑶𝑷)12 13 14 measures the profit (in USD) made by the organization from
the DMs’ lending decisions, computed using the net present values of the historical, approved
loans.
$

OP!" = <

#%&

V!"# = =

V!"#

NPV!"# ,
0,

(Total profit a DM generated for the firm in a round)
if loan was approved
if otherwise

(Net present value of a loan
approved by a DM in a round)

i = DM 1, 2, 3, …, I; I = 152
r = round 1, 2, 3, …R; R = 10
j = loan application number 1, 2, 3, … J; J = 10 (in each round)

12

Only the loans that were paid in full and that defaulted were included in this measure. We excluded the loans that were listed as Still Current (n
= 18 in the high condition, n = 27 in the low) and as Late for 31–120 Days (n = 2 for both conditions).
13
As we over-represented the number of poor performing loans in our two loan datasets, the loans’ total net present values in both were negative
(−$413,487.3 in the high condition, −$309,151.7 in the low). Thus, all subjects incurred organizational losses.
14
This is one among various ways of computing organizational profit from the DMs’ loan review decisions. Other methods include incorporating
in the measure the opportunity cost incurred by the organization when their DMs reject a good loan, or calculating the measure as a percentage of
the highest profit the organization can possibly make from all 100 correct decisions (rejecting all the bad loans and approving all the good loans),
etc. We chose this particular way of computing organizational profit for the sake of computational simplicity.
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6. Data Analysis and Results
The final, unbalanced sample used for analyzing our experiments included 152 participants.
Because we collected data over 10 repeated and distinct decision-making rounds and used roundlevel data, we had in total 10 × 152 = 1,520 observations. Table 3.4 presents the descriptive
analysis of our experimental data. We developed the following two regressions to examine (1)
the impacts of AI predictive accuracy on revision rate (a measure of algorithm appreciation) and
(2) the impacts of AI predictive accuracy and incentive structure alignment on organizational
profit (a measure of organizational outcomes):
)
𝑅𝐸𝑉 = 𝛼# + 𝛼$%&' 𝛴!'(
𝑃𝐸𝑅! + 𝛼$* 𝑃𝐴 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + e ,

(1)

)
𝑂𝑃 = 𝛽# + 𝛽$%& ! 𝛴!'(
𝑃𝐸𝑅! + 𝛽$* 𝑃𝐴 + 𝛽+,* 𝐼𝑆𝐴 + 𝛽$*×+,* (𝑃𝐴 × 𝐼𝑆𝐴) + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜑 (2)

In the equations above, 𝑅𝐸𝑉 refers to revision rate; 𝑂𝑃 refers to organizational profit; 𝛼, 𝛽 are
the intercepts; 𝑃𝐸𝑅! (𝑖 =1 to 9) are dummy variables that represent the 10 decision rounds; 𝑃𝐴
refers to AI predictive accuracy (1 for high, 0 for low); 𝐼𝑆𝐴 refers to incentive structure
alignment (1 for aligned, 0 for misaligned); 𝑃𝐴 × 𝐼𝑆𝐴 is the interaction term; and ε, φ are error
terms.
The nine dummy variables representing the 10 decision rounds (periods), 𝑃𝐸𝑅( –𝑃𝐸𝑅) , are
included in the models to control for possible learning effects over time15. The other control
variables account for the participants’ traits and demographics which include quantitative
reasoning competency, financial competency, financial risk tolerance16, familiarity with the loan

15

We controlled for learning at the round level and not the individual loan level because participants only saw the feedback page informing them
of how they performed at the end of each round.
16
Adapted from the well-known Financial Risk Tolerance scale by Grable & Lytton (Grable & Lytton, 1999)
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review context, English competency, college level, student status, work experience, ethnicity,
gender, and age, along with the characteristics of the loan applications reviewed by the
participants, and the actual performance of the AI in each round.
6.1. Hypothesis Testing
To examine the effect of AI predictive accuracy on revision rate, we conducted a hierarchical
multiple linear regression in 3 stages (see Table 3.5, Models 0–2). In each, we respectively added
the experimental period variables 𝑃𝐸𝑅! (𝑖 =1–9), the other control variables, and (in Model 2)
the main independent variable (AI predictive accuracy). Similarly, to examine the impacts of AI
predictive accuracy and incentive structure alignment along with their interaction effects on
organizational profit, we conducted a hierarchical multiple linear regression in 5 stages (see
Table 5, Models 0–4), adding the interaction effect in Model 4.
6.1.1. AI Predictive Accuracy and Algorithm Appreciation (H1)
Our results show that DMs working with the more powerful AI (high predictive accuracy)
collaborated more often with the system than did those in the lower quality condition: the former
exhibited stronger algorithm appreciation through revising their initial decisions more often after
seeing the computer predictions (16.6% higher in each round, p < 0.001) than the latter.
Specifically, participants in the high-quality condition whose initial decisions contradicted the AI
predictions reversed their personal judgment to ultimately follow the AI, on average 49% of the
times that conflicts occurred (1.53 revisions per round), while those in the low condition only did
so 32% of the times (0.94 revisions). This supports H1.
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Using the same regression as (1), we also examined another measure of algorithm appreciation,
change of mind (COM)17 (Marks et al., 2019) which incorporates DMs’ changes in confidence
when making their final decisions, and found interesting additional results: Those working with
the more powerful AI expressed stronger belief in their joint work with the machine than did
those exposed to the inferior AI (p < 0.001), with an average increase of 75.5%18. Thus, the
presence of a high-performing AI resource prompted DMs to not only follow its predictions
more but also feel more confident in their decision-making. This additional result therefore
explains how higher predictive accuracy led to stronger algorithm appreciation.
6.1.2. AI Predictive Accuracy and Organizational Outcomes (H2)
Model 3 in Table 3.5 shows that those working with a higher performance AI, compared with
those exposed to a lower performance AI, saved the organization $7,047.4 on average in each
decision round (for a 38.6% reduction, p < 0.001). This supports H2.
Using the same regression as (2), we examined two additional measures of organizational
outcomes, type-I and type-II error rates19, which reflect decision quality. We found that: subjects
working with higher performance AI produced both lower type-I and type-II error rates than did
those assisted by the low performing AI, respectively 11.1% and 14.9% less, both with p <
0.001. This additional insight explains how higher AI predictive power drove higher profits—
through improving decision quality.

17

Essentially, COM measures to what degree viewing the AI predictions influences the DMs’ final decisions and confidence levels. Thus, it
reflects the DMs’ appreciation of and trust in their joint work result with the AI. COM’s measurement formula: If Final Decision ¹ Initial
Decision: COM = α(FinalConfidence + InitialConfidence) [α = 1 if Initial Decision ¹AI; = −1 if the reverse]; If Final Decision = Initial
Decision: COM = α(FinalConfidence − InitialConfidence) [α = −1 if Initial Decision ¹ AI; =1 if the reverse]
18
This is computed using the mean COM of DMs in these two experimental treatments—high power AI and low power AI (75% = (216.45 123.31)/123.311).
19
Type I error rate: number of falsely rejected loans divided by number of loans that performed well (paid in full, on time payments) in each
round. Type II error rate: number of falsely approved loans divided by number of loans that performed poorly (defaulted, late, etc.) in each
round.
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Research has shown that people often discount insights from algorithms and advice in general,
and that it is not certain that people can distinguish between good and bad advice from its face
value (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Logg et al., 2019). Thus, receiving better advice—in this case,
highly accurate AI predictions—does not necessarily lead to better decision-making by people.
Our experimental subjects did not know there were two differing levels of AI predictive quality,
“high” and “low”, or which one they were working with. They only knew the given predictive
accuracy rate, 80% or 60%, both of which significantly more accurate than mere 50-50 chance.
Through repeated rounds of decision-making with clear, immediate performance feedback, the
subjects could naturally detect on their own how helpful the algorithmic predictions were for the
given task and adapted their decision-making to their specific experimental condition. They did
not follow or disregard the machine blindly; they used their own human judgment and selfadjusted their behavior accordingly.
6.1.3. Incentive Structure Alignment and Organizational Outcomes (H3)
Model 3 in Table 3.5 also shows that participants working under an aligned incentive structure
outperformed those under a misaligned incentive structure in achieving their organizational
objectives (p < 0.001), lowering organizational losses by $5,921.10 in each round (on average a
23.1%20 reduction). This supports H3.
We additionally found that DMs in the aligned condition, compared to the misaligned condition,
had lower type-II error rates (reducing them by 14.9%, p < 0.001) and higher type-I error rates
(increasing them by 8.6% , p < 0.001). This finding is important because it explicates how the
participants in our experiment produced higher profits for the organization when the incentive

20

This is computed using the mean organizational profits of these two treatments—aligned and misaligned.
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structure as defined in the pay-off matrix was strategically aligned with the given organizational
lending strategy.
Under the assumed risk profile present in the lending strategy (i.e., risk averse), an effective
incentive alignment structure should nudge the subjects toward making more conservative
lending decisions, meaning that they should err more on the conservative side by accepting an
overall fewer amount of loans and by being more cautious with riskier loans. Strategic incentive
alignment for a given lending strategy should improve decision-making quality in terms of error
rates in accordance with that strategy. For a risk-averse strategy, it should trade costly type-II
errors for less costly type-I errors to result in fewer type-II errors at the expense of more type-I
errors. In our experiment, which manipulated a pay-off matrix that represented to our subjects’
risk–reward incentive structure at two alignment levels, this behavioral change was exactly what
we found, which translated into significantly higher profits (loss savings) in the well-aligned than
in the poorly-aligned condition.
6.1.4. Interaction Effect (H4)
Model 4 (see Table 3.5) shows that there is a significant interaction effect between AI predictive
accuracy and incentive structure alignment for organizational profit. Specifically, implementing
a strategically aligned incentive mechanism benefited the organization in terms of profits (i.e.,
loss savings) generated from their lending business, regardless of the deployed AI system’s
predictive level (saving on average $5,921.1 in each round). Crucially, complementing a high
performing AI resource with a well-aligned incentive structure led to maximized profit
(minimized loss) for the firm. Equally or perhaps more important is that (see Figure 3.4),
strategically aligning incentive structure produced considerably more savings for the
organization (p < 0.01) in the low predictive accuracy condition, with a reduction of ~58% (from
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−$20,281.81 to −$8,461.8), than in the high predictive accuracy condition, where the firm only
saved by ~50% (from −$12,145.29 to −$6,019.57). This supports H4.
Additionally, we also found that the significant interaction effect on organizational profit was
largely driven by the interaction (in the same direction) on type-II error rates21. While incentive
structure alignment in general significantly lowered the rates of falsely approving bad loans
(type-II errors), it mattered more in the low condition than in the high condition (p < 0.001). This
further explains how AI predictive accuracy and strategic incentive alignment interactively
impact organizational profit. Taken together, these findings suggest that although incentive
structure alignment always presents an important foundational practice, it is generally most
critical when the AI resources that provide algorithmic decision aid for the human DMs are not
best-of-breed. In reality, AI performance can often degrade, due to changes in business
environment, industry standards, and data quality. Thus, it can be in the firms’ best interests to
complement their AI knowledge resource with a well-designed incentive structure, as it helps
them avoid significant damages in such cases and get the most value from their AI investments
in general.
6.1.5. Learning Effect (H5)
To examine the general increase in organizational profit over time, we conducted four different
tests and obtained consistent results. First, we ran a partial version of our final, full model
(Model 4) in the hierarchical regression used for testing our first 4 hypotheses. In this partial
model (Model 4-P), we removed the experimental period dummies PERi (i = 1-9). We found that
R2 decreased by 11% moving from the full (R2 = 0.45) to the partial model (R2 = 0.40). We
21

Moving from a misaligned to an aligned incentive structure, DMs increased their type I-error rates similarly in both conditions of AI power:
~21% in low and ~22% in high. We conjecture that this was caused by the subjects’ exposure to the risk-averse lending strategy manipulation in
all conditions, inducing them to all act more conservatively in general when reviewing loans.
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further conducted the partial F-test and found that the difference between the two models is
indeed significant (p < 0.001).
Second, we conducted a regression test that models the 10 experimental periods as a continuous
variable (Round), thereby assuming linearity, to examine whether there is a significant effect of
time on organizational profit. We found that organizational profit significantly increased as the
decision rounds passed (p < 0.001). The model considerably improved when adding control
variables (R2 = 0.34, from 0.11).
Third, we adapted the progress function commonly formulated in the firm progress literature
(Dutton & Thomas, 1984) to test the following general learning model:
𝑂𝑃 = 𝐴 × 𝑋 *

(3)

where OP = the organizational profit for the Xth period, X = the decision period number, A = the
organizational profit for the first decision period, and B = the progress rate. In this general
learning model, the decision period number is a proxy for experience. To test the model, we
applied log transformation on both sides of the equation, and the model (3) above became:
log (𝑂𝑃) = log (𝐴 × 𝑋 . ), which is equivalent to: log(𝑂𝑃) = log(𝐴) + 𝐵 × log(𝑋)

(4)22

Applying the model on our data, using all 10 rounds, we found that B = 0.08 (p < 0.01), R2 =
0.01. We tested the model again with the first round removed and found consistent and slightly
stronger results, where B = 0.15 (p < 0.001) and R2 = 0.02.
Fourth, following the standard practice in the experimental economics literature (Cadsby &
Maynes, 1998; Embrey et al., 2018; Fréchette, 2009) for analyzing potential learning effects in

22

Because the organizational profit variable in our experiment contains negative values, we had to add a constant to its log transformation. The
constant was = 1 - its minimum value = 1 + 62,289.66 = 62,290.66.
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repeated round experiments, we compared the average organizational profit measure between
clusters of decision periods. Specifically, we looked at the earlier 5 rounds vs. the later 5 rounds.
Overall, across all treatments of the human-machine teams, the average organizational profit per
round improved significantly in the later periods, with a loss reduction of 40% (p < 0.001). In
each of the conditions, the increase in organizational profit over time also showed to be
significant23. We also found consistent results when we further broke the decision-making
periods into 3 clusters (first 3, middle 4, and later 3 rounds).
Thus, across these different empirical analyses, all of our results consistently support our H5 that
the learning effect with respects to organizational profit is present and significant.
Interestingly, we further found that as the ten experimental rounds progressed, the DMs began to
increasingly “absorb” the AI’s capabilities. That is, they made initial decisions that over time
significantly increased in similarity to the AI, prior to even being shown its predictions24. This
shows that, albeit working with two different datasets and AI accuracy levels, the DMs'
partnerships with the machine across conditions over time implicitly led to actual internalization
and absorption of the AI's knowledge and capabilities. Thus, our results show that through
recurring interactions with the AI, the DMs learned to work more effectively with the machine.
6.2. Post-Hoc Analysis
In this section, we present several more interesting patterns and insights beyond our ex-ante
hypothesis testing, which we uncovered after running our experiments. We wanted to look at

23

Specifically, in both the low and high power AI treatments, there are significant learning effects between the early 5 and late 5 rounds (p
<0.001). The DMs in the Low Power AI treatment (mean_early = - $19,187, mean_late = - $10,488) however seemed to improve more than the
DMs in the High Power AI treatment (mean_early = - $10,966, mean_late = - $7,243). This could be explained by the fact that it is harder for
people to improve over time when working with an AI that is already fairly high in predictive power in all of the 10 rounds.
24
Comparing the earlier 5 rounds’ mean rate of agreement between DMs’ initial decisions and AI predictions, to the later 5 rounds’: Mearly = 0.61,
Mlate = 0.67, t = −4.53, p < 0.001
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how human–machine collaboration fared in terms of organizational outcomes, relative to the
other two decision-making paradigms: decision-making by humans alone (i.e., expert-driven)
and by machines alone (i.e., automated). Thus, we ran a baseline human-only treatment that did
not feature any AI decision aid (see Section 4.3). We then compared organizational profit among
the three decision-maker profiles.
First, when ranking organizational profit among all three (see Table 3.6), we found that averaged
across all experimental conditions, human–machine teams worked best, especially when the
humans worked with high-performing AI systems in an environment wherein organization goals
and DM incentives were strategically aligned. Human-machine teams maintained their top
position when guided by an aligned incentive structure in general. However, in the misaligned
setting, human-machine teams were thrown off by the incentive signals that conflicted with the
given organizational goals. Thus, the humans were not able to collaborate as effectively with the
machine. Interestingly, in the low-performing AI context, humans working without any
algorithmic assistance performed the best, beating both the human–machine teams and the fully
automated machine, despite ranking lowest when averaged across all conditions. This underlines
that humans still matter in algorithmic decision-making contexts. We explain this in depth next.
We conducted a set of non-parametric tests (see Table 3.7) to see whether the differences we
found were also statistically significant. First, using the Kruskal Wallis test, we found that,
overall, the three decision-maker profiles did produce different profit outcomes (p < 0.05).
Second, comparing between human-machine teams and the machine alone, we found that
averaged across conditions, the human–machine partnership did indeed significantly trump the
intelligent machine operating on its own, reaping higher profits (lower losses) for their
organization (p < 0.05). Specifically, having humans collaborate with the machine reduced mean
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losses by 11.8%25 and median losses by 4.6% (see Tables 3.6, 3.7), compared to leaving the
machine on its own.
Analysis of each condition revealed that humans working with the AI could outperform the
machine only when guided by a strategically aligned incentive structure. Particularly, in the
powerful AI setting, strategically aligning the incentives of the human DMs enabled the
corresponding human-machine teams to cut mean losses by 20.1% and eliminate median losses
entirely, relative to the machine itself (p < 0.05). Furthermore, in the less powerful AI setting,
properly connecting the human DMs’ incentives to their organizational strategy led the
respective human-machine teams to save their organization in mean losses by 24.4% and in
median losses by 49%, compared to having the machine operate autonomously (p < 0.001).
These substantial boosts in organizational profit suggest that, in our particular decision context,
strategic incentive alignment was the reason why human–machine collaboration could
outperform automated decision-making, even the high-power intelligent machine.
Third, comparing human-machine teams to humans working alone, we found that on average
across all conditions, providing human DMs with AI assistance did indeed yield significantly
higher organizational profit relative to pure human decision-making (p < 0.001). Additionally,
we also found evidence confirming that averaged between two different incentive structure
conditions, such is the case only when the AI assisting the human DMs had high predictive
power. Specifically, the DMs collaborating with the higher power AI reduced net losses for their
organization by 36.2% (p < 0.001) compared to humans working on their own, regardless of the
incentive structure alignment level. On the other hand, working with a less reliable AI may have

25

We computed the mean loss percentages using the mean organizational profit of the three decision-maker profiles, overall with all conditions
pooled together and in each separate condition, which are reported in tables 6. (-11.8 % = (-11,461.91 + 12,998.18)/(-12,998); -20.1% = (7,314.25 + 9,157.7)/(-9,157.7); -24.4% = (-12,735.92 + 16,838.67)/(-16,838.67))
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actually hurt the organization’s profit, as they slightly increased losses (by 4%, which was,
however, not statistically significant) compared to those working by themselves.
The observed inferior performance of the humans partnering with the lower power AI relative to
the humans working alone was mainly driven by the misaligned incentive structure. That is,
when such partnerships between the humans and the low performing AI operated under the
misaligned incentive structure, they decreased profits (increased losses) by 20% (p < 0.05)
relative to the humans without any AI assistance. However, when the humans had to work with
the inferior AI but were guided by the well-aligned incentive mechanism, they actually raised
profits (lowered losses by 10.7%) relative to their unaided counterparts working on their own,
although this increase was statistically not significant. Still, this result substantiates our
interaction effect finding (H4) and suggests that a well-designed incentive structure can
safeguard the organization against significant losses, even in the face of a suboptimal AI
resource. Thus, all of our post-hoc findings when taken together re-emphasize the critical role of
appropriate organizational practices in successful algorithmic decision-making.26
To summarize, our additional analysis showed that in our experiment, human-machine
collaboration overall outperformed both the humans alone and the machines alone in bringing
profits to their organization. It further showed that such substantial achievement of the humanmachine collaborative decision-making depended on complementing high quality AI resources
with well-designed incentive structures.

26

We find mostly consistent results when comparing type I and type II error rates across the 3 decision-maker profiles using the same statistical
tests, especially with type II error rates.
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6.3. Discussion of the Results
Overall, our primary and post-hoc analyses combined suggest that human judgment and
organizational processes continue to be essential for AI-driven organizations. First, in the high
performing AI setting, keeping humans in the loop to collaborate with the machine can yield
significant business value for the organization. Particularly, proper business processes in the
form of strategic incentive structure alignment enabled the human-machine collaborative teams
in such setting to reap the highest profits for the firm—relative to all the other technologyorganizational practice configurations and decision-making paradigms that we examined in this
study.
Second, in less optimal conditions such as declining AI predictive power, involving humans in
the decision-making process can help prevent the organization’s decision-making from veering
off its track. This is evidenced by our finding that humans working with a less reliable AI
incurred bigger losses for the firm than those working by themselves, and significantly more so
in the presence of poorly aligned incentive structures. Firms across industries often experience
that the predictive accuracy of their AI systems may fluctuate with considerable volatility,
caused by changes in the business environment or the data degrading the performance of the
algorithmic model, which may require retuning or retiring the prediction model. Humans are
therefore critically needed in such cases, and in general, to continually monitor and assess the
algorithmic decision-making processes. They can then readily decide when to recalibrate the AI
model or remove it completely, and also if necessary, redesign certain crucial organizational
processes and practices.
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7. General Discussion
7.1. Theoretical Contributions
We contribute to three research streams. First, we extend the growing algorithm aversion and
appreciation literature by moving beyond merely examining human DMs’ attributes to highlight
the intersectional roles of organizational practices and AI technology characteristics in effective
algorithmic decision-making. Methodologically, we observed actual decision-making by people
using an AI system, albeit in a simplified lab experiment. Furthermore, our use of a repeated
round design featuring immediate and continuous feedback brought to bear that human–machine
collaboration takes time to evolve and develop before it can create sustained business value. As
such, our study design and results empirically validate the conjecture of Yeomans et al.
(Yeomans et al., 2019) that, with additional experience with AI, human DMs may become more
understanding of the AI and increase their overall rate of usage.
Second, we contribute to the nascent automation literature, by not only examining human versus
machine, but also how human–machine teams stack up against the machine and the humans
alone. We show that, in our experimental setting, human–machine teams overall outperformed
both, even the high performing automated AI. Moreover, we delineate specific conditions where
this occurs robustly. This nuanced understanding is important to the evaluation of tasks’
suitability for automation. Our experimental results complement Daugherty and Wilson’s
(Daugherty & Wilson, 2018) survey findings that, of the 1,500 organizations they studied, firms
that achieved the most significant improvements were those that combined human and machines
in their operations. Malone (Malone, 2018) similarly argued that, if we coordinate intelligent
machines with intelligent humans, we could achieve far greater things than if we leave decisionmaking entirely to the machines or the humans alone.
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Lastly, we contribute to the ACAP literature. We apply and validate ACAP in a new decision
context, human-machine collaboration, and interpret the theory’s main factors through
specifically the AI predictive power and incentive alignment constructs. Further, our study is one
of the few IS studies adopting ACAP theory that directly measured the construct ACAP (Roberts
et al., 2012). To our knowledge, we are also the first to use directly observed decision-making
behavior data combined with real-world historic data (in the case of organizational profit and
type I and type II errors) to measure ACAP in a controlled experimental setting, instead of
measuring the construct through perceptual responses to hypothetical survey questions.
7.2. Practical Implications
Our results present three main implications for organizations deploying AI in complex decisionmaking operations. First, we provide empirical evidence underscoring the importance of humans
in such contexts. The role of humans in the current and near-future employment landscape
continues to be a subject of heated debate27. We found that overall, human-machine teams in our
experiment delivered significantly more value to the organization than machines alone or
humans alone. We also found that humans working alongside a lower quality AI (with a still
respectable 60% predictive accuracy, which is significantly better than random chance), on
average, performed even worse than humans working on their own. In many industries and
decision-making contexts, AI models often fluctuate in predictive power. Therefore,
organizations should prioritize developing human capital and invest in advancing employees’
analytic skills. They can then empower their human DMs to collaborate with the machines

27

On the one hand, concerns have heightened regarding full automation soon replacing humans in not only routine but also non-routine, more
complex roles. On the other hand, major industry and academic reports consistently project a wide range of new job vacancies that will be created
to manage increasingly complex AI technologies (Autor et al., 2019; Giffi et al., 2018).

53

effectively, and also to readily recognize whenever AI predictive power deteriorates and
intervene in the process.
Second, we show that learning effects form and strengthen the human-machine’s productive
working relationship. Over the course of ten decision periods, the human DMs’ repeated
exposure to the AI resulted in significant intelligence augmentation for the DMs, increased
organizational profit, and thus benefited the organization as a whole. Altogether, having humans
in the loop alongside the AI can over time lead to an ever-evolving “symbiosis” of human and
machine decision-makers (Daugherty & Wilson, 2018), where both act as continually
complementing partners.
Third, our study highlights the importance of organizational factors for firms’ algorithmic
decision-making success. Reports have shown that most firms adopting AI have neglected this
issue (Chui & Malhotra, 2018; Fountaine et al., 2019). Incentive alignment, specifically, guided
human-machine teams in closely achieving their organizational goals. Thus, combined with
investing in high performing AI infrastructures, firms can further improve decision-making
quality by designing incentive structures aligned with their organizational strategy to trade-off
type I and II errors to either reduce risk (conservative decision-making) or accept more risk
(aggressive decision-making).
7.3. Limitations and Future Research
Like all experimental studies, ours has several limitations that future research can potentially
address. First, although our study focused on complex, non-routine decision-making in an
organizational setting, we used only one particular task: reviewing consumer loan applications.
Second, our incentive structure alignment mechanism was specifically designed for an assumed
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conservative, risk-averse organizational strategy. While we expect our incentive alignment
operationalization should be applicable to other complex tasks similar to our experimental task
such as personnel selection, diagnosing diseases/illnesses, recidivism, among others, a somewhat
different parameterization of the incentive alignment mechanism would likely be required for
complex tasks of a different nature. Third, our manipulation of AI technological quality focused
on variations in predictive power. Other characteristics of AI, such as degree of volatility, typeI/type-II error ratio, or different user interfaces, certainly have impacts on DMs’ attitudes and
decision patterns that should be investigated in the future. Fourth, we used students as our
subjects and not practitioners. However, the use of student subjects in economic experiments for
the purpose of testing organizational theories has been widely accepted and many studies have
shown that professionals act more or less similar to students in experiments (Frechette, 2015).
Further, we controlled for quantitative competencies, work experience, age, and familiarity with
the task in our data analysis.
These limitations fall under the issue of external validity which future research is needed in order
to increase it. Testing a general hypothesis (on complex organizational decision making) with
data collected from a specific context (evaluating loan applications), like what we did in our
experiment, can only provide limited support for such hypothesis. In that sense, a single
experiment like ours which needs to choose a specific context to operationalize the decisionmaking task can only establish limited external validity (Fréchette & Schotter, 2015). Context
however has been recognized as an important auxiliary condition (treatment variable) in the
experimental economics literature (Smith, 1982) that should be explicitly stated, which we did in
our hypothesis formulation (the task context of reviewing loan applications). The only way to
establish solid external validity is to replicate an empirical (e.g., experimental) study’s findings
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across different contexts and through different empirical methods. Even then, findings in a lab
environment may not fully transfer to real-world settings outside the lab. Nevertheless, as long as
the directions of the lab findings occur also in real settings, while the quantitative magnitudes
may differ, most experimental researchers would consider those externally valid (Kessler &
Vesterlund, 2015).
Hence, to increase external validity, future studies should test our results using similar
experimental design for different types of tasks, using different subject populations,
manipulating different AI characteristics, decision model parameters, and incentive alignment
mechanisms. In addition, future research can employ other methods, such as field studies and
natural experiments, to test if our controlled lab experiment results can be replicated.
8. Conclusion
In this study, we examine the effects over time of AI predictive power and incentive alignment
on the outcomes of human-machine collaborative decision-making in organizational complex
task contexts. Our research is important given the lack of AI power and stability in many
complex task settings in organizations, societal demands for ethical values and accountability
requiring that humans are present in the decision processes, along with the dearth of extant
research fully examining the socio-technical factors surrounding this issue (Green & Chen,
2019).
We find that human and machines can form an effective working relationship that strengthens
over time when firms complement high AI predictive power with proper incentive alignment
practices. Further, we find evidence suggesting that human judgment matters in complex
organizational decision-making processes that employ AI. In the case of a high-power AI,
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humans partnering with AI outperformed even the highly advanced machine itself. In the case of
a lower-power AI, humans without AI assistance actually performed better than both the human–
machine teams and the autonomous machine. Thus, human intervention would be crucial in such
cases to redirect the firm’s decision-making to the right track. At a larger scale, our study’s
findings bear some implications for the current employment landscape, given rising concerns
about automation replacing human workers and even the idea of eradicating the need for
organizational structures and processes.
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CHAPTER 4
[STUDY 3]
HUMAN-MACHINE COLLABORATIVE DECISION-MAKING IN ORGANIZATIONS:
EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF ALGORITHM PREDICTION BIAS ON DECISION BIAS
AND PERCEIVED FAIRNESS
1. Introduction
Recently, algorithmic bias has attracted explosive attention in both industry and academia.
Extant research has mostly approached examining algorithmic bias from a technical perspective,
with many studies attempting to design fair algorithmic models (Khademi et al., 2019; Robert et
al., 2009; Xu et al., 2020), collect better quality data (Lu et al., 2019), and operationalize
different types of fairness for AI models (Kasy & Abebe, 2020). Few studies have empirically
investigated the decision bias of human-machine collaborative decision-making, wherein human
experts have the final say after working with the algorithms.
The importance of investigating this topic is twofold. First, human-machine collaboration serves
as an important decision-making paradigm in many organizations today (Autor et al., 2019;
Daugherty & Wilson, 2018). Particularly, human experts are increasingly employed to work
alongside AI in many complex decision-making contexts where the current industry standard of
AI predictive power is far from a level that can warrant full automation. Further, societal
demands for accountability, regulations, and ethical values require humans to stay in the loop
with the machines even in decision contexts with significantly higher AI predictive power.
Second, besides machines, research has shown that humans make many biased decisions
themselves (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Further, studies have

58

also empirically shown that perceptions of decision fairness differ among people, depending on
the decision context, differing personal ethical values, and the roles people take in each context
(e.g., whether they are directly affected by the decisions, are the decision-makers, or are the
designers of the decision-making model), how they are personally rewarded/penalized based on
the decisions they make or receive, and so on. It is therefore crucial to move beyond managing
the bias of the algorithm component alone to also consider the perceptions and biases of the
human component (Adomavicius & Yang, 2019) and, importantly, to examine the bias of the
human-machine collaborative decision-making entity as a whole.
The few studies in extant literature that investigated decision bias of human-machine
collaboration have not looked at whether different levels of AI bias have varying effects on the
decision bias of the human-machine teams. This is important to examine because of two reasons.
First, the degree of AI bias often fluctuates, making it crucial to understand the varying effects of
different levels of AI bias on the decision bias of human-machine teams. Second, it has not been
empirically studied whether technical approaches of bias mitigation from the algorithm side
actually mitigate bias in algorithmic decision-making wherein human experts still play a major
role. Further, most of these studies have also not demonstrated whether different levels of AI
bias have varying impacts on human decision-makers’ perceptions of fairness. Understanding
this can potentially further explicate decision-makers’ behaviors when working with AI in the
examination of human-machine teams’ decision bias. It can also help organizations better
motivate their employees and sustain employees’ positive morale for collaborating with the
machines. Lastly, most of these studies have not considered the possible learning effect over time
resulting from human decision-makers’ repeated interactions with the AI. This is worth
investigating because studies in the firm progress function literature (Dutton & Thomas 1984,
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Lundberg 1961) show that many organizational processes significantly improve in efficacy over
time, simply through the act of being carried out by employees repeatedly.
Motivated by this need to empirically examining the bias of human-machine collaboration in
complex decision-making, specifically considering the technological attributes (AI’s varying bias
levels), the DMs’ perceptions, and the learning effect over time, we pose the following research
questions:
RQ1. What is the effect of AI prediction bias (i.e., error rate imbalance between groups) on
organizational outcomes (i.e., firm profit and decision bias in terms of error rate
imbalance between groups) in the context of human-machine collaboration for complex
decision-making?
RQ2. What is the effect of AI prediction bias (i.e., error rate imbalance between groups) on
human decision-makers’ perceptions (i.e., algorithmic fairness) in the context of humanmachine collaboration for complex decision-making?
RQ3. What is the effect of time (i.e., number of decision periods where DMs work with the AI)
on organizational outcomes (i.e., firm profit and decision bias in terms of error rate
imbalance between groups) in the context of human-machine collaboration for complex
decision-making?
To address these three questions, we conduct a controlled economic experiment with a repeatedround design. We assign participants with a task that models a complex organizational decisionmaking process wherein human decision-makers (DMs) work with an AI repeatedly over 10
decision periods to evaluate consumer loan applications. We use loan data from a large-scale,
historic dataset from Lending Club and manipulate the AI predictions to create two experimental
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conditions: (1) Prediction Bias, where DMs work with AI predictions that discriminate against
one group of loan applicants and favor another, and (2) No Bias, where DMs work with AI
predictions that treat the two loan applicant groups equally.
We find that human DMs can over time learn to adapt to a biased algorithm, implicitly detect the
bias in the AI, adjust their behavior, significantly improve their performance, and most
importantly, outperform the biased AI working alone in terms of reducing decision bias and
increasing organizational profit.
2. Related Studies
We review here the current experimental studies examining decision bias in the realm of humanmachine collaborative decision-making. Rhue (2019) showed that biased algorithmic predictions
influenced human decision-makers through the anchoring effect, making them make more biased
final decisions compared to the humans working without algorithmic predictions. In addition, the
author showed that informing the human DMs with the AI’s error rate reduced the errors in the
humans’ final decisions (Rhue, 2019).
Also focused on the anchoring effect of AI bias on human decision-makers’ decision bias,
Vaccaro (2019) showed that DMs working with a biased AI made more biased decisions
compared to the DMs working alone. The author thus argued that in certain cases such as this
where the anchoring effect is at play, the human-machine collaborative decision-making
paradigm caused decision bias to increase compared to the humans working by themselves. The
two studies therefore raised the concerns that including AI in decision-making process alongside
humans does not necessarily improve human decision-making performance in terms of bias, and
can actually make the bias worse.
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Although in Vaccaro’s (2019) and Rhue’s (2019) experiments, participants worked with an AI
on the same tasks (predicting recidivism rate in the former, and guessing people’s age and rating
their beauty score in the latter) for a number of times, they did so in a one-shot manner. More
specifically, these participants working with an AI made their multiple decisions one
immediately after another in a single decision period, and did not receive feedback about their
own and the AI’s decision performances, either after each decision or after a series of decisions
throughout the experiment. Thus, these two studies did not consider the possible learning effects
over time of the DMs who worked with an AI and received performance feedback repeatedly for
multiple decision periods over time.
In addition, for the comparison of performance regarding decision bias among the humanmachine teams, the humans alone, and the machine alone, these two studies only employed one
particular AI, thus largely overlooking AI’s varying performance characteristics (varying levels
of bias) that could potentially alter human DMs’ behavior, perceptions, and decision-making
performance when working with the AI.
Further, these studies did not examine the impact of working with a biased AI on the decisionmakers’ perception of AI fairness, which potentially plays an important role in explaining the
humans’ decision-making behavior, and their performance and decision bias resulting from their
collaboration with the AI.
3. Theoretical Framework & Hypothesis Development
We use insights from economics, statistics, computer science/human-computer interaction, along
with Rational Choice Theory as the theoretical basis for our research model. In the following
subsections, we review the multiple approaches to defining and measuring decision-making bias,
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along with extant empirical findings on people’s perceptions of fairness. We then present our
research hypotheses grounding in Rational Choice Theory and previous empirical findings.
3.1. Bias and Fairness
We first clarify what we refer to when we use the terms bias and fairness in our paper. We view
bias as an objective construct that can be mathematically measured, and fairness as a subjective,
perception-based construct, used for evaluating whether a decision is in accordance with
established ethical values and social norms.
Bias, which in our study we specifically focus on group bias, arises when there is a measurable
difference in decision outcomes, through comparing the predictive accuracy and/or error rate
balance between groups of people who are affected by the decisions. The source of this bias can
come from the data used for training the predictive algorithm (i.e., data bias), the actual coding
of algorithms (i.e., algorithm bias), or human decision-makers’ minds (i.e., cognitive bias). As
such, bias can be objectively (mathematically) established by inspecting the data, the predictions
of the algorithms, or the decisions of the humans or human-machine teams.
Fairness, which in our study we also specifically focus on group fairness, on the other hand is
when people perceptually evaluate whether the differences found in decision outcomes are fair or
not for all of the groups that the decisions affect. In other words, fairness is a higher level
evaluation of the implications of decision bias across groups. Fairness deals with social norms
about justice and equal outcomes being viewed as the desired outcomes. More specifically,
fairness is predicated on the philosophical assumptions that society needs to create equal
outcomes across different groups of people.
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To that end, we use bias in our study to specifically refer to the objective, mathematical measures
of whether or not a set of predictions or decisions produce unequal outcomes among groups of
people. We use fairness to specifically refer to people’s subjective evaluations of whether or not
a set of predictions/decisions complies with social norms of justice and equal outcomes among
groups.
3.2 Measuring Bias
3.2.1 Statistical Approach
The decision context of our study – loan applications review – falls under the binary
classification decision problem. Many other common, complex decisions also belong to this
category of decision-making type. Examples include hiring decisions, college admission
decisions, medical diagnoses, predicting recidivism when setting bail amounts, and so on.
In this classification decision problem, there are typically two possible decisions/predictions and
two possible outcomes. In the case of loan applications review, the two possible
decisions/predictions would be approving a loan application and rejecting it. Because the
variable of interest to lending organizations is usually whether the loan will be a bad loan
(defaulting, late payments, etc.), approving a loan—predicting low risk of becoming a bad
loan—is considered a negative decision, and rejecting a loan—predicting high risk of becoming
a bad loan—is considered a positive decision. Similarly, the two possible outcomes of loan
applications—turning out to be a good loan and turning out to be a bad loan would constitute
respectively a negative and a positive outcome. A confusion matrix (see table 4.1) can thus be
constructed to evaluate the different possible types of decision/prediction errors resulting from
this decision problem.
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For this type of classification decision problem, there are various statistical measures that are
commonly used to assess whether an algorithm or a decision-maker is biased against certain
groups of people. Depending on the decision context and the decision-maker’s priority, one or
several of them can be selected and compared among different groups of people.
The first set of measures are referred to as predictive parity among groups. This consists of
positive predictive value and negative predictive value, which either or both are computed and
compared among groups.
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =

𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =

𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠

The second set of measures are referred to as error rate balance among groups. This consists of
false positive balance and false negative balance. Specifically, false positive rate and/or false
negative rate are computed and then compared among groups.

𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠

𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠

Third, accuracy equity is another measure that can be used to determine whether there is bias
against certain groups. Specifically, the prediction/decision accuracy rate is computed and
compared among groups.
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𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =

𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 + 𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠

3.2.1 Economic Approach
In economics, the Becker Outcomes test is a well-known measure used to determine whether the
decisions reached were biased against certain group(s) of people (Becker, 1993). An unbiased
decision according to the Becker test is when it produces equal productivity across groups at the
margin (Cowgill & Tucker, 2019). In the context of lending decisions like in our study where we
want to ensure equal outcomes between two groups of loan applicants—group A and group B,
the Becker Outcomes test would conclude a DM (e.g. loan manager) or an algorithm is biased
against group B if the least qualified (i.e., at the margin), approved loan applicant from group A
had a higher default risk score than the least qualified, approved loan applicant from group B.
More specifically, given a historical dataset of approved loan applications containing the loans’
terms (e.g. amount, interest rate, number of installments, number of payments made etc.), their
group information (e.g., A or B), their predicted default risk scores, and their actual outcomes
(defaulted or paid in full), we can rank the loan applications in each group based on some
measure like their net present values (NPV). Then we can compare the default risk scores
between the lowest ranked (in terms of NPV), approved loan from group A and the lowests
ranked, approved loan from group B.
3.3. Evaluating Fairness
Even though the statistical measures described above, among many others, are considered
objective, mathematical measures of bias, there is usually a significant amount of subjectivity
involved in choosing which measure(s) to assess decision fairness. In fact, different stakeholders
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have been found to often have differing opinions about which measure(s) should be used to
evaluate whether a set of decisions or predictions are fair or not. For instance, in the COMPAS
(an algorithm predicting recidivism risk) case, the defendants and social justice critics were more
interested in false positive balance between racial groups, whereas the designers of the algorithm
(Northpointe) were more interested in predictive parity.
Similarly, empirical research on perceptions of fairness have also demonstrated that people’s
fairness perceptions vary drastically among different stakeholders. For instance, in the humancomputer interaction literature, Lee and Baykal (2017) showed that despite the programmers’
efforts to design unbiased algorithms, a sizable portion of users felt they were treated unfairly by
the AI. The authors found that the main reason for this was fairness definitions differed between
the end users and the algorithm designers/programmers, and even among the end users.
Relatedly, in the economics literature, Babcock et al. (1995) demonstrated through an
experiment that in bargaining decision contexts, the people involved judged fairness differently
in a self-serving manner, and this tendency intensified as the amount of provided information
increased. Their results echo findings in the experimental psychology literature that people often
view decisions that satisfy their self-interests as fairer than the ones that do not.
Taking a different approach, Konow (2009) examined if people can achieve convergence in
fairness perceptions when they are (unlike in the cases and studies described thus far in this
section) not the directly implicated parties in the decision outcomes. The author found that
consensus on perceptions of what is fair in this case did occur when more detailed information
about the decision context was provided to the people evaluating decision fairness. Further, the
author also found that varying personal characteristics did not significantly influence people’s
fairness perspectives (Konow, 2009).
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3.4 Research Hypotheses
We combine the research findings described above (Sections 2 and 3.1-3.3) with the perspectives
of Rational Choice Theory to develop our research hypotheses.
3.4.1 AI Bias and the Human-Machine Teams’ Performance
Based on anchoring theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which has been demonstrated in
empirical studies regarding the anchoring effect of AI predictions in human-machine
collaborative decision-making (Vaccaro 2019, Rhue 2019), we posit that those working with the
biased AI would be influenced to some extent by its predictions, and thus would make more
biased decisions and in turn make less profit for their organization compared to those working
with those working with an unbiased AI. Hence, our H1a-H1c :
H1a: AI prediction bias is positively associated with false positive rate imbalance between two
groups of loan applicants in human-machine collaboration for evaluating loan applications.
H1b: AI prediction bias is positively associated with false negative rate imbalance between two
groups of loan applicants in human-machine collaboration for evaluating loan applications.
H1c: AI prediction bias is negatively associated with organizational profit in human-machine
collaboration for evaluating loan applications.
3.4.2 AI Bias and the DMs’ Perceptions
In our experiment, the participants are financially rewarded and penalized based on decisionmaking performance, with their incorrect decisions being quite seriously penalized. Thus, they
can be considered a group of stakeholders directly implicated by the outcomes of their joint loan
review decision-making process with the AI. This means that participants’ perceptions of AI
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fairness, motivated by their own financial interests, would depend to some extent on the
performance of the AI assigned to them, which as per H1 would likely influence the performance
of their collaborative work with the AI. Because participants receive immediate feedback after
each round in the experiment on the performance of the AI predictions and of their joint
decision-making with the AI, along with how much they earned personally, the participants
working with the biased AI should be more likely than those working with the unbiased AI to
perceive their algorithmic partner as less fair. We base our postulation on the empirical findings
regarding the anchoring effect of AI bias and perceived fairness reviewed above (Section 2 and
3.3, respectively) and on RCT which would predict that DMs, independent of their personal
biases if any, would want to maximize their earnings. Hence our H2:
H2. AI prediction bias is negatively associated with human decision-makers’ perceived
algorithmic fairness in human-machine collaboration for evaluating loan applications.
3.4.3 Learning Effect over Time of the Human-Machine Teams
Also following RCT and the Horndal plant labor effect (Lundberg, 1961) found in the firm
progress function literature, we posit that through repeatedly interacting with the AI and
continually receiving feedback on the performance of the AI and of their joint work with the AI,
decision-makers – both those working with the biased and unbiased AI, would begin to adapt
their behavior, motivated by their self-interests to maximize their earnings, which in turn would
improve their performance relative to the AI operating alone. Specifically, the difference in the
profit they make for their organization relative to that of the AI would increase over time. Hence,
our H3:
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H3: There are positive organizational learning effects in human-machine collaboration for
evaluating loan applications: over time, the difference between the organizational made by the
human-machine teams’ and that made by the AI alone increases.
(We focus on the difference in organizational profit to remove the potential influence
(anchoring) of AI predictions on the human-machine teams’ performance.)
4. Study Design
4.1. Research Method, Dataset, Algorithmic Predictions
We adopt experimental economics as our main research method and design a decision-making
platform that simulates actual organizational decision contexts. We have run experimental pilot
sessions with a total of 72 participants. Table 1 summarizes our study design. The participants
were undergraduate students majoring in Business at a large university in the U.S. We paid
participants with financial rewards to induce rational behavior (Smith, 1976). Participants earned
a flat reward ($5) for completing the entire session and a bonus reward determined by their
decision-making performance in the experiment (total ranging $5 – $20, averaging $10).
In the experiment, participants worked with an AI tool to evaluate 100 consumer loan
applications and made the final decisions (approve/reject). We derive the set of 100 loan
applications that the participants reviewed in the experiment from a real world, large-scale
historic dataset from LendingClub (n = ~50,000). The subset of loan applications (n = 100) that
the participants reviewed in the experiment contains 50 loans that performed poorly (bad loans)
and 50 loans that performed well (good loans).
This historic dataset includes real consumer loan applications' information (e.g., occupation,
income, outstanding debt, loan purpose, loan requested amount, income, etc.) and real loan
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performance data for the loans that were funded (e.g., loan interest rates, monthly payments,
defaults, late payments, etc.). Because of that, we knew which loans performed well and which
did not. The participants in the experiment saw the simplified consumer loan application data but
not the loan performance data when they made their decisions. The participants’ decisionmaking performance, however, was determined based on the real loan performance data.
4.2. Experimental Task
The experimental task comprised 10 repeated but distinct rounds. In each, the DMs made
decisions (approve/reject) for 10 loan applications (total of 100) with the aid of an AI. The DMs
received immediate decision feedback at the end of each round.
There were 3 stages in each round: Initial Decisions, Final Decisions, and Results. In the Initial
Decisions stage, the DMs viewed a loan data table that contained the loan applicants’
information, made their initial decisions (approve/reject), and rated their initial level of
confidence (1-100). In the Final Decisions stage, the DMs viewed the same loan table but that
had been updated with their own initial decisions and the AI predictions (presented next to each
other). Based on this new information, the DMs now had the opportunity of revising their initial
decisions and confidence levels before submitting the final decisions and confidence ratings. In
the Results stage, the DMs received feedback on how the loans actually performed, the DMs’
and the AI’s performance statistics (i.e., rate of correct decisions), and their cash earnings from
each decision, the round total, as well as the cumulative total.
4.3. Financial Reward Structure
The DMs in all experimental conditions earned $0.2 for each correct decision (i.e., approve or
reject), and $0 for each wrong reject decision (false positive). They lost $0.4 for each wrong
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approve decision (false negative). Table 4.2 shows this reward structure in the form of a pay-off
matrix. This incentive mechanism was designed to connect the DMs’ rewards to the assumed
risk-averse, conservative lending strategy that we stipulated for the study, i.e., discouraging the
DMs from making risky bets via high penalties for the wrong approve decisions (false negative).
We induced this assumed, fixed conservative, risk-averse organizational lending strategy in our
experiment, by telling the subjects in the instructions to “imagine that you are a loan officer for a
traditional retail bank” and “your task is to identify good loan applications for approval and
risky loan applications for rejection”.
4.4. Experimental Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted synchronously online via Zoom meetings, each
lasting between 60–75 minutes from beginning to end. Sessions were scheduled according to a
pre-determined plan with several sessions for each experimental treatment. The number of
participants varied (ranging 2–16) for each session. In each session, after all participants have
joined the Zoom meeting, the experimenter welcomed and introduced briefly to the participants
the basic structure of the session which included 3 parts: a pre-experiment survey, a decisionmaking task, and a post-experiment survey.
Next, the experimenter sent the participants the URL to the online experimental platform and
instructed the participants to complete the pre-experiment survey that consists of questions about
their demographic characteristics and personality traits. After making sure every participant had
finished the survey, the experimenter presented the instructions slides on the Zoom meeting
screen and also at the same time read the instructions aloud to explain in detail the loan review
task and the financial reward structure, i.e., the pay-off matrix detailing how much they will earn
or lose for each correct (incorrect) loan decision.
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The participants did not know that there were multiple treatments, nor did they know which
particular treatment they were participating in. After the participants finished the experimental
task, they were required to complete the post-experiment survey which contained questions
about their decision-making process and their perceptions (e.g. regarding how fair the AI was,
how much they trusted the AI, how fair their cash earnings were, etc..) Finally, the participants
were dismissed and later on were paid via online bank transfers according to how much money
they earned in the task.
4.5. Treatment Details and Manipulations
We ran a pilot for our study with 2 treatments: Prediction Bias (n = 35) and No Bias (n = 28). In
addition, we also ran a session of the Prediction Bias treatment with extended decision time (n =
9) to preliminarily test whether allowing the DMs additional time for reviewing the loan
applications would have an impact on their performance and decision fairness. Table 4.3
summarizes our experiment’s treatments and sample size.
4.5.1. The Two Groups of Loan Applicants
We operationalized the two groups of loan applicants in our experiment by randomly splitting
the 100 historic loan applications used in our experiment into two (fictional) groups with equal
size: Purple (n = 50) and Orange (n = 50).
We represented these two groups in the experiment by highlighting the loans’ IDs and labels
respectively in the ID and Applicant Type columns in the loan applications table shown to the
DMs, accordingly with two colors – purple and orange (see figure 4.1 for a partial view of the
experiment interface). To make the two groups of loan applicants clear to the DMs, we informed
the DMs in the instructions portion of the experiment, prior to the start of the task, that for their
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loan review task, there are two groups of loan applicants, denoted by the colors purple and
orange, highlighted in the ID and Applicant Type columns.
We operationalized the two loan applicant groups through color labels (Orange and Purple)
because we wanted to avoid any confounding effects that might result from using the applicants’
personal information such as gender, ethnicity, occupation, names, or any other stimuli (visuals,
names, etc.) which different people can have different personal responses to. We are not
interested in how people personally respond to certain groups of the population.
In both treatments, each group has the same number of good (n = 25) and bad loans (n = 25). In
other words, in both treatments, there are 25 loans for each of the four categories: Good Purple,
Bad Purple, Good Orange, Bad Orange.
4.5.2 Prediction Bias
In the Prediction Bias condition, while the loan data used in the experiment are unbiased with
respects to the Orange and Purple groups, the algorithm predictions shown to the DMs are
biased. Specifically, the Orange and Purple groups have different false positive rates (Orange =
0.2, Purple = 0.6) and different false negative rates (Orange = 0.6, Purple = 0.2). In other words,
the algorithm predictions in the Predict Bias treatment inaccurately discriminate against the
Purple (rejecting more good loans) compared to the Orange group, while inaccurately favoring
the Orange (approving more bad loans) over the Purple group. The overall accuracy of the
algorithm predictions in the Prediction Bias condition is 60%.
In the No Bias condition, both the loan data and the algorithm predictions used in the experiment
are unbiased between the two groups. Specifically, both Orange and Purple groups have the same

74

rates of 0.2 for false positive and false negative (i.e., type I and type II error rates). The overall
accuracy of the algorithm predictions in the No Bias condition is 80%.
Tables 4.4 – 4.6 summarize the AI’s decision bias metrics in each condition.
4.5.3. Decision Time
In the Prediction Bias condition run with extended decision time, the Initial Decision stage had a
time limit of 3 minutes, the Final Decision stage 2 minutes, and the Results stage 1.5 minutes. In
the conditions run with regular decision time, the Initial Decision stage had a time limit of 2
minutes, the Final Decision stage 1 minute, and the Results stage 1 minute as well.
5. Data Analysis
5.1. Prediction Bias and Human-Machine Teams’ Performance (H1)
To examine the impact of the experiment factor (Prediction Bias) on the human-machine teams’
performance, in terms of decision bias (false positive rate imbalance between Purple and Orange
groups, false positive rate imbalance between Orange and Purple groups), and organizational
profit, we developed the following regressions:

,
𝐹𝑃𝐼 !"#$% = 𝛽& + 𝛽!'( ) 𝛴)*+
𝑃𝐸𝑅) + 𝛽!- 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜑
,
𝐹𝑁𝐼$%#!" = 𝛾& + 𝛾!'(! 𝛴)*+
𝑃𝐸𝑅) + 𝛾!- 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜇
,
𝑂𝑃 = 𝛼& + 𝛼!'(! 𝛴)*+
𝑃𝐸𝑅) + 𝛼!- 𝑃𝐵 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + e

In the equations above, 𝐹𝑃𝐼$/012 , 𝐹𝑁𝐼 120$/ , 𝑂𝑃 respectively refer to false positive imbalance
between Purple and Orange groups, false negative imbalance between Orange and Purple groups,
and organizational profit; 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾 are the intercepts; 𝑃𝐸𝑅! (𝑖 = 1 to 9) are dummy variables that
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represent the 10 decision rounds; PB refers to prediction bias (1 for bias, 0 for no bias); and e, 𝜑,
𝜇 are error terms.
The dummy variables representing the 10 decision rounds are included in the regressions
because we collected decision-making data over 10 repeated and distinct rounds, with feedback
provided to the participants after each round, and thus we wanted to control for the possible
learning effects that we conjectured had occurred over the rounds.
The final, unbalanced sample used for analyzing our two main experimental treatments (No Bias
and Prediction Bias) included 63 participants. Because we used round-level data, we had in total
10 rounds × 63 participants = 630 observations. Table 4.7 presents the descriptive analysis of our
experimental data.
The other control variables account for the participants’ traits and demographics which include
quantitative and financial competency, college level, ethnicity, gender, and cognitive style. The
descriptive statistics of the participants’ performance, traits, demographics, and perceptions are
included in Tables 4.8 - 4.9 below.
Specifically, we conducted a hierarchical multiple linear regression for each of the performance
variables, in 3 stages (see Table 4.10a-c, Models 0–2). In each, we respectively added the main
independent variable (prediction bias), the experimental period dummy variables 𝑃𝐸𝑅! (𝑖 =1–9),
and finally in Model 2, the other control variables.
We computed false positive imbalance between purple and orange by computing the difference
in the false positive error rates between the purple group and the orange group (subtracting the
false positive error rate of orange group from that of purple group).
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We computed false negative imbalance between orange and purple by computing the difference
in the false negative error rates between the orange group and the purple group (subtracting the
false negative error rate of purple group from that of orange group).
We computed organizational profit (in USD) resulted from the loan review decisions by
calculating the net present values of the historical, approved loans.
Results show that the human-machine teams in the biased predictions treatment had a
significantly higher positive rate imbalance between purple and orange groups than those in the
unbiased treatment (8% higher, p < 0.05). In addition, working with biased predictions led to
significantly higher negative rate imbalance between orange and purple groups compared to
working with unbiased predictions (10.4%, p < 0.001). In other words, the presence of biased
algorithmic predictions did negatively influence the human DMs’ decisions in the same way that
the AI is biased: discriminating against the purple group and favoring the orange group.
Further, the human-machine teams in the biased predictions treatment also made significantly
less profit for the organization than those in the unbiased predictions treatment, costing their
organization around $6,036 on average in each round (p < 0.001).
Thus, our H1a, H1b, and H1c are supported.
5.2. Prediction Bias and Human DMs’ Algorithmic Fairness Perception (H2)
We measured perceived algorithmic fairness by asking the participants after they had completed
the entire experimental task to rate on a Likert scale of 1-7 (1 = Strongly Disagree, 7 = Strongly
Agree) regarding whether they think that the AI treated all the loan applicants equally.
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To examine the impact of prediction bias on perceived algorithmic fairness, we conducted a twoway t-test to compare the perceived algorithmic fairness measure between the biased predictions
treatment and the unbiased treatment. Results show that there was a small and insignificant (p =
0.4) difference in perceived fairness between those working with the biased AI (m = 4.8) those
working with the unbiased AI (m = 5.1). We further found that, however, the former rated their
trust in the AI (m = 11.3) significantly (p < 0.01) less than the latter (m = 13.3) for a decrease of
15 %. We measured this AI Trust construct by adapting the 3-item Trust Belief scale by Robert,
Dennis, and Hung (2009). Thus, the DMs appeared to implicitly recognize the biased predictions
of the AI rather than explicitly.
Interestingly, we found a significant, albeit weakly, difference (p = 0.08) when we compared
perceived algorithmic fairness between the DMs working with the biased predictions and given
extra time limits for making decisions (m = 4.1) and those working with the unbiased predictions
(m = 5.1), for a decrease of 19.6 %.
5.3. Learning Effect over Time (H3)
We first computed the difference in organizational profit between the human-machine teams and
the AI alone. Then, following the standard practice in the experimental economics literature
(Cadsby & Maynes, 1998; Embrey et al., 2018; Fréchette, 2009) for analyzing potential learning
effects in repeated round experiments, we compared the average of this measure between clusters
of decision periods. Specifically, we looked at the earlier 5 rounds vs. the later 5 rounds. Overall,
across all treatments of the human-machine teams, the average difference in organizational profit
compared to the AI alone’s organizational profit per round increased significantly in the later
periods, with a rise of of 179% (p < 0.001). More specifically, in the earlier 5 rounds, the human-
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machine teams made on average $3,012 less than the AI alone while in the later 5 rounds, they
made on average $2,383 more than the AI alone.
Analyzing conditions separately, we found that this improvement in organizational profit relative
to the AI alone was also significant. However, those working with the biased AI improved in the
later 5 rounds considerably more than those working with the unbiased AI. Specifically, while
the former improved in their organizational profit relative to the AI alone by 383%, the latter
only did so by 59%. Moreover, while those working with the biased AI in the later 5 rounds
made for the organization on average $4,546 more than the AI alone in each round, those
working with the unbiased AI in the later 5 rounds made for the organization on average $2,395
less than the AI alone in each round.
Intrigued by this finding, we further directly compared the human-machine teams’ performance
with the AI alone’s performance using the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for matched pairs. We
found that overall, across all treatments, on average in each round the human-machine teams
outperformed the AI alone, in both achieving higher organizational profit (p = 0.06) and reducing
bias – lowering both false positive imbalance (p < 0.001) and false negative imbalance (p <
0.001). This superiority was found to be stronger when we only included the performance
measures of the later 5 rounds. Analyzing treatments separately, we found that, however, humanmachine teams in the unbiased treatment in particular did not outperform the unbiased AI alone.
6. Discussion
We contribute to current research on bias in human-machine collaboration by showing that
human DMs can learn to work with an imperfect, biased AI to improve significantly their
performance over time and also outperform the biased AI working on its own. Working with a
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biased AI is often the case in reality as it is almost impossible to design a completely unbiased
AI. As such, our research shows that with repeated interactions, timely feedback, and an
appropriate incentive mechanism, organizations can reap benefit from having human DMs work
with biased algorithms, to reduce bias significantly and improve their profit.
Second, we contribute by empirically demonstrating that human DMs working with a less biased
(in this case, a completely unbiased) AI can produce less biased decisions and made higher
organizational profit. This shows that bias mitigation in the algorithm component can translate to
bias mitigation in human-machine decision-making partnership if combined with the right
conditions -- incentive mechanism, time, exposure, and clear feedback). Most current studies
have not examined or demonstrated this.
Our third contribution is adding a dynamic perspective. Unlike most present behavioral studies
on bias in human-machine collaboration, our experiment features the repeated round design (as
opposed to one-shot), which allowed us to perform a longitudinal analysis that shows the more
nuanced dynamics of how DMs interact with AI over time. In real life situations, it is usually
through repeated interactions with new technologies that organizational DMs gain familiarity
and improve their performance significantly.
Methodologically, we are the first to our knowledge, in examining the bias in human-machine
decision-making, to operationalize bias in terms of error rate imbalance between two fictional
groups with neutral labels, which allowed us to reduce (if not completely avoid) the potential
confounding effects of DMs’ personal biases.
On a related note, we expect to find similar results in future research where instead of
manipulating the loan applicant groups through fictional neutral labels, we do so by using certain
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information such as race, gender, religion, etc., which DMs likely have varying personal
responses (biases) to. Specifically, we expect that over time, DMs motivated by their self-interest
to maximize their financial earnings, can also learn to adapt their decision-making behavior, and
to some extent overcome both their own biases and the AI’s biases to improve their performance,
reduce decision bias, and increase profit for their organization.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUDING REMARKS

This dissertation examines the organizational and technological factors that impact collaborative
decision-making in the context of Big Data and machine-learning based Artificial Intelligence.
While examining different research questions, all three studies in the dissertation focus on
looking at the interaction and working relationship built over time between the human decisionmakers and the machine. In the first study, human DMs work with a computer aid that processes,
organizes and then presents information to support them in making their decisions. In the second
and third studies, human DMs work with a more advanced computer aid that in addition to
processing and organizing information also provides them with recommendations in the form of
predictions.
The findings in the three studies point to the crucial and intertwined roles of organizational
factors and technological attributes in the context of human-machine collaboration in
organizational complex decision-making. As such, this dissertation as a whole contributes to the
human-machine collaboration, information processing, and data visualization literatures by
emphasizing the dual importance of organizational and technological factors, which have not
been adequately examined in previous studies.
The prevalence of AI systems, along with the need for collaboration—both between human and
machine and among humans, continues to rise rapidly in organizations, especially for complex
decision-making contexts. Because of that, there are many interesting questions yet to be
examined in the realm of human-machine collaboration, particularly with respects to biases and
perceived fairness in algorithmic decision-making.
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Thus, I plan to expand my research to examine various other factors’ impacts on human-machine
working relationship and firm performance. The factors include information transparency (level
of details in the feedback given to the decision-makers), perceived advisor (decision-makers
being told predictions come from a human advisor or from an algorithm), diversity (the
composition of the decision-maker groups), and AI systems’ pricing structure.
In addition, as preliminary results show that when provided with extra time for making decisions,
decision-makers working with biased predictions appeared to more explicitly recognize the bias
in the AI than those given less time. This could be another potentially important factor to be
examined.
The next immediate step is to conduct additional experimental treatments for Study 3, one of
them being a baseline condition where human decision-makers work by themselves without any
algorithmic assistance to evaluate the same set of consumer loan applications as in the two
treatments already conducted (No Bias and Prediction Bias). The purpose would be to see how
humans working on their own with a completely unbiased dataset (equal prevalence between two
applicant groups) fare compared to the human-machine teams and the machine operating by
itself.
Further, in many cases, algorithmic bias comes from the data rather than the predictive model,
and thus I also want to conduct another experimental treatment where human decision-makers
work with biased datasets to compare their perceived fairness and their performance measures
with those working with unbiased datasets.
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FIGURES & TABLES

CHAPTER 2
Table 2.1. Experiment Parameters
Rounds
20
Group Size

5

Threshold

13 tokens

Endowment

11

Reward

5 tokens

Exchange Rate

1 token = 5 cents

Table 2.2. Measures
Measure

Computation

Group Distance to Equilibrium (DTE)

| Group Contribution - Nearest Equilibrium |

Group Contribution

Amount of Tokens in Group Account

Individual Earnings

Endowment - Contribution + Reward (if any)

Group Earnings

Sum of All Group Members' Earnings

Table 2.3. Treatment Details
Visualization Scheme
Raw Data
Provision
Scheme

Table

Graph

Full

3 groups

5 groups

4 groups

Aggregate

4 groups

4 groups

4 groups
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Figure 2.2a. Average Group Contribution - Compare between 2 Provision Schemes

Figure 2.2b. Average Group Contribution - Compare among 3 Visualization Schemes
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Figure 2.2c. Average Group Contribution - Aggregate Information

Figure 2.2d. Average Group Contribution - Full Information
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Figure 2.3a.

Figure 2.3b.
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Figure 2.3c.

Figure 2.3d.
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Figure 2.4a.

Figure 2.4b.
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Figure 2.4c.

Figure 2.4d.
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Figure 2.4e.
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CHAPTER 3

Figure 3.1. Three Decision-making Paradigms. [A]: Expert-driven Decision-making; [B]: Automated Decisionmaking; [C]: Human–machine Collaborative Decision-making; ---- : Feedback Loop

Figure 3.2. Conceptual Model
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Figure 3.3. Experimental Task Interface in Partial View.
(Top - Bottom) Initial Decisions Page, Final Decisions Page, Results Page
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Figure 4. 1 Interaction Effect of AI Predictive Accuracy and Incentive Structure on Organizational Profit

Table 3.1. Study Design Overview
Research Method
Experimental Economics (controlled lab experiments with financial incentives)
Participants

Undergraduate Students, Business Majors

Duration of Each Session

60–75 Minutes

Structure of Each Session

1. Arrival & Introduction 2. Survey 3. Instructions Video 4. Data Glossary &
Instructions Handouts 5. Decision-Making Task 6. Payment & Exit

Decision-Making Task

Review 100 consumer-loan applications, split over 10 decision rounds

Payment

Cash, USD $5–20 (Performance-Based)

Table 3.2. Experimental Conditions and Sample Size
Incentive Structure Alignment
Aligned

Misaligned

AI Predictive
Accuracy

High (80%)

High-Aligned (26 participants)

High-Misaligned (37 participants)

Low (60%)

Low-Aligned (23 participants)

Low-Misaligned (21 participants)

Baseline

No AI

Baseline (45 participants)

Table 3.3. Pay-off Matrices for the Aligned and Misaligned Incentive Structure Conditions
Approve
Reject
Incentive Structure Alignment
Aligned
Misaligned
Good Loan
Bad Loan

1

$0.2
−$1

Incentive Structure Alignment
Aligned
Misaligned

$0.2
$0

$0
$0.2

$0
$0.2

We use high/low perform AI, high/low performing AI, and high/low performance AI interchangeably in this paper.
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Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics of Algorithm Appreciation and Organizational Outcomes Measures
Variable
Condition
Aligned
Misaligned
Main Effect
High Accuracy
0.44 (0.37)
0.53 (0.36)
0.49 (0.37)
Revision Rate
Low Accuracy
0.32 (0.37)
0.31 (0.33)
0.32 (0.35)
Main Effect
0.38 (0.37)
0.45 (0.36)
High Accuracy
−$7,314 ($10,602)
−$10,362 ($12,815)
−$9,104 ($12,037)
Organizational
−$12,736 ($14,640)
−$17,139 ($14,545)
−$14,838 ($14,744)
Low Accuracy
Profit
Main Effect
−$9,859 ($12,933)
−$12,816 ($13,843.64)
Notes: The numbers outside the parentheses are the means, inside are the standard deviations.
Table 3.5. Impacts of AI Predictive Accuracy and Incentive Structure Alignment on Algorithm Appreciation and
Organizational Outcomes
Model 0

Intercept
PER1
PER2
PER3
PER4
PER5
PER6
PER7
PER8
PER9
LoanPerformance
BadLoansNum
AIPerformance
QuantCompetence
FinCompetence
FinRiskTolerance
LoanFamiliarity
EngCompetence
CollegeUpperLev
FullTimeStudent
WorkExperience
Ethn_Minorities
Gender_Male
Age
PredAcc
IncStrAlignmt

Revision
Rate

Org. Profit

0.336****
0.230****
0.202****
0.034
0.009
0.027
0.040
0.092*
0.131***
0.055

−12,190.230****
−1,662.211
−4,868.611***
−3,740.106**
−1,720.426
1,210.000
10,824.890****
11,988.480****
−3,618.692**
−1,130.073

Model 1

Model 2

Revision
Org. Profit
Rate

Revision
Rate

0.114
0.215****
0.210****
0.032
0.032
0.065
0.069
0.096*
0.156***
0.047
−0.00**
−0.032
0.036***
0.020
−0.0003
0.024****
0.002****
−0.001*
0.006
0.038
−0.003
−0.015
−0.052**
0.018

0.098
0.234****
0.193****
0.044
0.005
0.038
0.024
0.099*
0.112**
0.054
0.00
0.022
0.005
0.016
0.006
0.027****
0.002****
−0.001
−0.0003
0.007
−0.002
−0.011
−0.052**
−0.001
0.166****

7,376.884
181.053
2,408.996
−6,554.545****
−2,234.405
−6,635.218****
10,141.740****
1,795.933
4,687.546***
2,606.706*
0.051
−5,130.781****
963.407**
1,015.260**
−1,266.234****
−126.643
46.054****
−52.274**
2,896.928****
3,435.622
250.929*
−1,079.964
579.440
−2,335.274**

PredAcc ´
IncStrAlignmt
R2
∆ R2
Adj R2

Model 3

Model 4

Org. Profit

Org. Profit

Org. Profit

7,064.709
1,078.644
1,473.715
−5,997.568****
−3,827.861***
−8,112.400****
7,284.708****
1,877.230
2,365.245
2,859.828**
0.266****
−2,412.749***
−679.275*
813.174*
−971.265****
6.104
32.305***
−44.479*
2,595.707****
1,712.722
301.772**
−834.519
508.083
−3,306.382***
8,616.799****

−153.391
2,119.722
1,950.615
−4,687.227***
−4,099.752***
−6,487.917****
5,149.605***
1,046.337
2,678.171*
2,961.969**
0.268****
−1,662.745**
1,918.944****
751.856*
−952.759****
144.196
31.174***
−34.670
2,272.560***
2,412.383
284.518**
−667.639
208.130
−3,867.066****
7,047.352****
5,921.090****

−2,011.360
2,376.119
2,068.066
−4,364.516***
−4,166.713***
−6,087.839****
4,623.771***
841.704
2,755.238*
2,987.124**
0.269****
−1,478.034**
2,558.834****
724.379
−997.536****
89.362
31.248***
−46.652*
2,384.127***
3,644.674
354.249***
−792.448
214.161
−4,101.335****
8,538.186****
9,153.875****
−4,361.225***2

0.043
0.173
0.111
0.367
0.136
0.418
0.043
0.173
0.068**** 0.194****
0.025****
0.051****
0.034
0.166
0.091
0.353
0.116
0.405
0.362 (df = 12,338.860 (df = 0.351 (df = 10,866.850 (df 0.346 (df = 10,421.500 (df =
Res. Std. Error
1017)
1060)
1003)
= 1046)
1002)
1045)
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients are displayed3. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; **** p < 0.001.
PredAcc: Predictive Accuracy; IncStrAlignmt: Incentive Structure Alignment

2

0.440
0.022****
0.427
10,227.250 (df =
1044)

0.445
0.005***
0.431
10,186.080 (df =
1043)

This interaction term’s coefficient is the additional difference between aligned and misaligned incentives if AI power changes from low to high
(or, between high and low AI power if incentives change from misaligned to aligned)
3
We used non-standardized measures for PA and ISA, in our analysis as recommended for categorical variable in the statistics literature (Fox,
2015)
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Table 3.6. Performance Ranking Among the Three Decision-Maker Profiles (Mean Org. Profit Per Round)
1st Rank
H-M Teams (−$11,461.91)
H-M Teams (−$9,104.34)
Humans Alone (−$14,265.62)
H-M Teams (−$7,314.25)
Machine Alone (−$9,157.70)
H-M Teams (−$12,735.92)
Humans Alone (−$14,265.62)

Condition
Overall
High
Low
High-Aligned
High-Misaligned
Low-Aligned
Low-Misaligned

2nd Rank
Machine Alone (−$12,998.18)
Machine Alone (−$9,157.70)
H-M Teams (−$14,837.53)
Machine Alone (−$9,157.70)
H-M Teams (−$10,362.23)
Humans Alone (−$14,265.62)
Machine Alone (−$16,838.67)

3rd Rank
Humans Alone (−$14,265.62)
Humans Alone (−$14,265.62)
Machine Alone (−$16,838.67)
Humans Alone (−$14,265.62)
Humans Alone (−$14,265.62)
Machine Alone (−$16,838.67)
H-M Teams (−$17,139.29)

Table 3.7. Comparing Organizational Profit Among the Three Decision-Maker Profiles
Wilcoxon
Kruskal Wallis
Mean
Mean
Mann-Whitney U
Median
Median
Signed Rank
H Test
(Per Round) (Per Round)
Test4
(Per Round) (Per Round)
Test5

Condition

Comparing
Among Three
Modalities

All Conditions

𝜒 ! (2) = 8.99**

Humans
Alone

H-M Teams
vs. Humans
Alone

H-M
Teams

−$14,265.62 −$11,461.91 W = 3146***

H-M Teams
vs. Machine
Alone

Machine
Alone

H-M
Teams

−$9,520.67

−$9,079.01 W = 3554**
−$8,636.06 W = 1094

𝜒

! (2)

Low Accuracy

𝜒

! (2)

High-Aligned

𝜒 ! (2) = 27.6**** −$14,265.62 −$7,314.25 W = 1018****

−$8,887.48

$0

High-Misaligned

𝜒 ! (2) = 14.09**** −$14,265.62 −$10,362.23 W = 1223****

−$8,887.48

−$9,079.01 W = 287

Low-Aligned

𝜒 ! (2) = 1.78

−$15,731.70 −$8,030.33 W = 241****

High Accuracy

****

****

= 26.86

−$14,265.62 −$9,104.34 W = 2241

−$8,887.48

= 0.86

−$14,265.62 −$14,837.53 W = 905

−$15,731.70 −$14,327.70 W = 694**

−$14,265.62 −$12,735.92 W = 597

W = 261**

Low-Misaligned 𝜒 ! (2) = 5.46*
−$14,265.62 −$17,139.29 W = 308**
−$15,731.70 −$15,715.47 W = 110
Notes: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; **** p < 0.001. H-M Teams: Human–machine Teams

4

We also ran t-tests for this comparison and found similar results with stronger significance for all conditions
We used Wilcoxon Signed Rank test (non-parametric test for matched pairs) to compare between Human–machine Teams and Machine Alone
because in the former entity, the human DMs viewed the AI predictions prior to finalizing their decisions, thus, their decision-making was
influenced by the machine. Hence, we treated the Human-machine Teams and the Machine, overall and according to the different (High accuracy,
Low accuracy) conditions, as matched pairs.
5
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CHAPTER 4

Figure 4.1. T-B: Initial Decision Page (partial view), Final Decision Page (partial view), Results Page
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Table 4.1

Good Loan Outcome
Bad Loan Outcome

Approve
(Predicting Low Risk of Bad
Outcome)
True Negative
False Negative

Reject
(Predicting High Risk of Bad
Outcome)
False Positive
True Positive

Table 4.2
Good Loan Outcome
Bad Loan Outcome

Approve
$ 0.2
- $0.4

Reject
$0
$ 0.2

Table 4.3. Experimental Treatments and Sample Size

Regular Time

No Bias

Prediction Bias

No Bias - Regular

Prediction Bias - Regular

28 participants

35 participants
Prediction Bias - Extended

Extended Time

9 participants

Table 4.4. AI’s Confusion Matrix - Prediction Bias Treatment (Against Purple, For Orange)
Good Loans
Bad Loans

AI Approves

AI Rejects

30 True Negatives

20 Type I Errors

10 Purple, 20 Orange

15 Purple, 5 Orange

20 Type II Errors

30 True Positives

5 Purple, 15 Orange

20 Purple, 10 Orange

Table 4.5. AI’s Confusion Matrix – No Bias Treatment (Orange and Purple Treated Equally)
AI Approves

AI Rejects

Good
Loans

40 (True Negatives)

10 (False Positives)

20 Purple, 20 Orange

5 Purple, 5 Orange

Bad Loans

10 (False Negatives)

40 (True Positives)

5 Purple, 5 Orange

20 Purple, 20 Orange

Table 4.6. AI’s False Positive and False Negative Rates Across Treatments
Treatments
False Positive Rate
False Negative Rate

No Bias

Prediction Bias

All Loans: 0.2;

All Loans: 0.4;

Orange: 0.2; Purple: 0.2

Orange: 0.2; Purple: 0.6

All Loans: 0.2;

All Loans: 0.4;

Orange: 0.2; Purple: 0.2

Orange: 0.6; Purple: 0.2
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Table 4.7. Descriptive Statistics of Performance Measures:
Prediction Bias

No Bias

Organizational Profit

-$22,929.47 ($18,828.66)

-$17,164.55 ($16,627.34)

False Positive Imbalance (Purple – Orange)

0.14 (0.43)

0.06 (0.46)

False Negative Imbalance (Orange – Purple)

0.16 (0.43)

0.05 (0.37)

Purple Type I Rate

0.34 (0.35)

0.30 (0.36)

Orange Type II Rate

0.40 (0.35)

0.26 (0.28)

Type I Rate

0.28 (0.22)

0.27 (0.23)

Type II Rate

0.33 (0.22)

0.24 (0.18)

Note: Numbers outside parentheses are the means, inside are the standard deviations
Table 4.8. Participants’ Ethnicities
East Asian

17

23.6%

South Asian

5

6.9%

South East Asian

7

9.7%

Black

5

6.9%

Hispanic/Latino

14

19.4%

Pacific Islander

1

1.4%

White - Europe

13

18.1%

White - Middle East or North Africa

10

13.9%

Table 4.9. Participants’ Demographics
Gender

Female : 22 (30.6%); Male: 50(69.4%)

College Level

Sophomore: 41 (56.9%); Junior: 22 (30.6%); Senior : 9 (12.5%)
Upper (Senior/Junior): 31 (43.1%)
Lower (Freshman/Sophomore) : 41 (56.9%)

Minority - Ethnicity 6

30 (41.7%)

Quant/Financial Competence

Mean (SD) : 48.6 (19) ; Min : 0 ; Med : 51.7 ; Max : 85.1

Cognitive Style - Faith in Intuition

Mean (SD) : 25 (5.7) ; Min : 9 ; Med : 25 ; Max 35

6

Includes Pacific Islander, Hispanic/Latino, Black, White – Middle East/North Africa
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Table 4.10a.
Org Profit
Model 1

Model 0
Prediction Bias

****

Model 2

****

-5,764.927

-5,764.927

19,925.210****

round_1
round_2

9,763.642

round_3

19,925.210****

****

9,763.642****

*

3,944.116*

3,944.116

round_4

-6,035.511****

-15,592.470

****

-15,592.470****

round_5

-3,527.116

round_6

-3,405.232

-3,405.232

round_7

23,390.640****

23,390.640****

round_8

-15,438.520****

-15,438.520****

round_9

-6,872.970

-3,527.116

***

-6,872.970***
92.732****

QuantFinComposite

3,866.205****

CollegeUpper
EthnMinor

861.158

Male

277.726

FaithIntuition

Constant
Observations
R2
Adjusted R2
Residual Std. Error
F Statistic

-94.639
****

****

-17,164.550
630
0.025
0.024
17,884.170 (df = 628)
16.164**** (df = 1; 628)

-18,383.280
630
0.512
0.504
12,742.510 (df = 619)
64.989**** (df = 10; 619)

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001

Table 4.10b.
False Positive Imbalance (Purple – Orange)
Model 0
Model 1
Model 2
0.081**

0.080**

round_1

-0.484****

-0.484****

round_2

-0.749

****

-0.749****

-0.754

****

-0.754****

-0.798

****

-0.798****

round_6

-0.435****

-0.435****

round_7

****

-0.772****

-0.725****

-0.725****

Prediction Bias

0.081**

round_3
round_4
round_5

-0.772

round_8
round_9
QuantFinComposite

-0.0003

CollegeUpper

-0.024

EthnMinor

-0.011

Male

-0.005

FaithIntuition

-0.006*

Constant

-22,523.610****
630
0.532
0.521
12,530.240 (df = 614)
46.550**** (df = 15; 614)

0.064**

0.654****

100

0.844****

Observations
504
504
504
2
R
0.008
0.342
0.347
2
Adjusted R
0.006
0.331
0.329
Residual Std. Error 0.445 (df = 502)
0.365 (df = 495)
0.365 (df = 490)
F Statistic
4.089** (df = 1; 502) 32.158**** (df = 8; 495) 19.992**** (df = 13; 490)
Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001

Table 4.10c.
False Negative Imbalance (Orange – Purple)
Model 0
Model 1
Model 2
Prediction Bias
round_1
round_2
round_3

0.104***

0.104****

0.104****

-0.209

****

-0.209****

-0.630

****

-0.630****

-0.370

****

-0.370****

round_4

-0.058

-0.058

round_5

-0.511****

-0.511****

round_6

-0.526****

-0.526****

round_7

0.069

0.069

round_8

-0.045

-0.045

round_9

-0.209****

-0.209****

QuantFinComposite

-0.001

CollegeUpper

0.021
-0.065**

EthnMinor
Male

0.025

FaithIntuition

-0.001

Constant
0.053**
0.302****
0.381****
Observations
630
630
630
2
R
0.016
0.345
0.355
2
Adjusted R
0.014
0.334
0.339
Residual Std. Error
0.406 (df = 628)
0.334 (df = 619)
0.332 (df = 614)
F Statistic
10.136*** (df = 1; 628) 32.586**** (df = 10; 619) 22.538**** (df = 15; 614)
Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; **** p<0.001
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